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Abstract 
 
In the context of the present conflict in Darfur, and in the years preceding it, the distinction 
between so-called African and Arab tribes has come to the forefront, and the tribal identity 
of individuals has increased in significance. These distinctions were never as clear cut and 
definite as they are today. The ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ distinction that was always more of a 
passive characteristic in the past has now become the reason for standing on different sides 
of the political divide. What then are the main factors which contributed to this new violent 
distinction between Arab and African? How is it possible for people and communities who 
have a positive history of cooperation and tolerance to suddenly plunge into a situation of 
such cruelty and hate towards one another. 
 
The thesis uses the New War framework to look at the current situation in Darfur. The most 
definitive version of this new framework is presented by scholars such as Mary Kaldor 
(2006), Martin van Creveld (1991) and Helfried Münkler (2005). The thesis then shows 
how the war in Darfur, exactly in line with the new war argument, has political goals with 
the political mobilization occurring on the basis of identity. Kaldor (2006) argues that the 
political goals in the new wars are about the claim to power based on seemingly traditional 
identities, such as Arab or African. Defining identity politics as “movements which 
mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power” 
(Kaldor, 2006: 80), it becomes apparent that Darfur has become subject to this these kind 
of new war politics. The study therefore questions the popular argument that ethnic conflict 
arises out of an “ancient hatred” or “tribal warfare”. 
 
Chapters three and four illustrates how this new distinction between Arab and African 
should rather be seen as the cumulative effects of marginalization, competing economic 
interests and, more recently, from the political polarization which has engulfed the region. 
Most of the factors leading to the current Arab/African antagonism were traced to 
contemporary phenomena. The study also looks at factors such as loss of physical coercion 
on behalf of the state, loss of popular legitimacy and effective leadership, 
underdevelopment, poverty, inequality, and privatization of force. The study then 
concludes that politics of identity should more often be seen as a result of individuals, 
groups or politician reacting to the effects of these conditions then as the result of ethnic 
hatred.  
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Opsomming 
 
In die konteks van die huidige konflik in Darfur, en die jare wat dit voorafgaan, het die 
verskille tussen sogenaamde ‘Afrikaan’ en ‘Arabier’ stamme na vore gekom. So ook het 
die stamverband van individue kenmerkend toegeneem. Hierdie onderskeid was nooit so 
noukeurig afgebaken en bepalend soos wat dit vandag is nie. Die ‘Afrikaan’ en ‘Arabier’ 
onderskeid wat in die verlede meer van ’n passiewe kenmerk was, het ontaard in die rede 
waarom beide kante hulself vandag in ’n politieke skeiding bevind. Wat dan is die hoof 
faktore wat bydra tot hierdie nuwe gewelddadige onderskeid tussen ‘Afrikane’ en 
‘Arabiere’? Hoe is dit moontlik vir mense en gemeenskappe met ’n positiewe geskiedenis 
van samewerking en verdraagsaamheid om skielik ’n toestand van soveel onmenslikheid en 
haat teenoor mekaar te ervaar? 
 
Die tesis maak gebruik van die Nuwe oorlog denkrigting in ’n poging om die huidige 
oorlog in Darfur te beskryf. Die mees bepalende weergawe van hierdie denkrigting word 
voorsien deur akademici soos Mary Kaldor (2006), Martin Creveld (1991) en Helfried 
Münkler (2005). Die tesis fokus op hoe die oorlog in Darfur (in lyn met die Nuwe Oorlog 
denkrigting) politieke doelwitte aan die dag lê, met die gepaardgaande politieke 
mobilisering wat geskied op grond van identiteit. Kaldor (2006) argumenteer dat die 
politieke doelwitte in die nuwe oorloë berus op die aanspraak tot mag op grond van 
skynbare tradisionele identiteite of stamwese, soos ‘Afrikaan’ en ‘Arabier’. As ’n mens 
identiteitspolitiek definieër as ’n beweging wat mobiliseer rondom etnisiteit, ras of geloof, 
met die doel om aanspraak te maak op staatsmag, dan blyk dit of die konflik in Darfur wel 
onderhewig is aan hierdie nuwe vorm van Nuwe Oorlog politiek. Die studie bevraagteken 
dus ook die gewilde aanname dat etniese oorloë ontstaan uit ‘stamoorloë’ of ‘antieke 
vyandskap’. 
 
Hoofstuk drie en vier verduidelik hoekom hierdie nuwe onderskeiding tussen ‘Afrikaan’ en 
‘Arabier’ eerder beskou moet word as die kumulatiewe effek van marginalisasie, 
kompeterende ekonomiese belange en die politieke polarisasie wat die streek in twee skeur. 
Meeste van die faktore wat gelei het tot die etniese polarisasie van die streek word hier 
beskou as kontemporêre verskynsels. Die studie kyk ook na faktore soos: die verlies van 
populêre legitimiteit en effektiewe leierskap, onderontwikkeling, armoede, ongelykheid en 
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die privatisering van mag. Die studie sluit af met die gedagte dat identiteitspolitiek in 
Darfur beskou moet word as die uitkoms van individue, groepe of politieke leiers wat 
reageer op die bogenoemde omstandighede, eerder as die resultaat van ‘antieke vyandskap’ 
of aggresiewe ‘stamoorloë’. 
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Chapter 1:     Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In 2005 the long process of reaching a peace agreement between the Sudanese government and 
the Southern rebels was finally ended after more than twenty years of protracted conflict in 
Sudan, this was marked by the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In the 
Western region of Darfur, however, violent conflict continues to rage and continues to draw 
the attention of the international community. United Nations officials estimate the amount of 
deaths due to non-violent causes to be more than 180,000 where others estimates places the 
total mortality since February 2003 near 400,000 (Reeves, 2005). Furthermore, it is estimated 
that more than 25-30 percent of the population of Darfur have been forcibly evicted from their 
homes and fields and that they have lost most or all of their assets, including the resources 
most essential for their survival, their livestock and crops.  
 
Some observers, such as US officials, have gone as far as to refer to the government and 
paramilitary unit attacks on the population as genocide (The American Journal of International 
Law, 2005: 266). While UN officials exhibit more reservation in labeling the conflict, they 
nonetheless insist that the government of the Sudan and the state sponsored militias are 
responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law 
amounting to crimes under international law. These include killing of civilians, torture, 
enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, 
pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. More so, these acts were also conducted 
on a wide spread and systematic basis so making it undisputed that they amount to crimes 
against humanity (UN, 2005: 3).  
 
The Darfur region of Sudan has been afflicted with a certain degree of conflict for several 
decades preceding the current wave of fierce ethnic warfare which broke out in 2003. These 
historical conflicts have usually involved pastoralists from the North which include tribes like 
the Rizeigat, Mahariya,l Zaghawa and various other smaller tribes. These tribes traditionally 
migrate to the South of the region in search of water sources and grazing land for their cattle 
and camels in the dry season, which usually ranges between November and April. In the mid 
1980s, however, large parts of Darfur was hit by successive droughts, especially afflicting the 
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Sahel region, and led to increasing desertification in Darfur. This had the effect of provoking 
land disputes between the Arab pastoralists and the agricultural communities. The disputes 
between these different communities usually started when the camel and cattle herding Arab 
Nomads started to invade the fields of the non-Arab farmers living in the central and Southern 
regions of Darfur in desperate search of water supplies and grazing land. Historically, however, 
such disputes have usually been resolved through negotiation between the different traditional 
leaders of both sides through a system of traditional tribal mediation (Human Rights Watch, 
2004).  
 
One of the early political warning signs to the current conflict in Darfur was when certain Arab 
tribes started to consider themselves as unequally represented in the Fur dominated local 
administration and in 1986 various of the Arab tribes formed what is known today as the “Arab 
Alliance” which had as its main goal the political and economical control of the region by 
Arabs. The non-Arab tribes, in turn, started to grow more and more distrustful of the local 
Arabs and the increasing tendency of the federal government to favour the Arabs. The rulers 
and elite from the government in the capital of Sudan in Khartoum were, and remains today, 
largely and historically comprised of Arabs from the Northern Nile Valley. This fear of Arab 
domination was only made much worse by the (then) Sadiq El Mahdi government (1986-1989) 
and its policy of Arming Arab Baggara militias from Darfur. These militias were known as 
“murahelleen” and they bear a striking resemblance to the Janjaweed militias which are 
operating in the current war in Darfur as government aided militias. These muraheleen were 
employed by the government as a counter-insurgency force against the Sudan’s People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA/M) during the long war against the South. The militias 
mainly focussed on looting, raiding, displacing, enslaving and punishing tribe members living 
in the SPLA territory (International Crisis Group, 2004: 1a).   
 
Later in the 1980s, however, these disputes became much more bloodier, largely because of the 
introduction of light automatic weapons. By the late 1980s these violent incidents started to 
include non-Arab tribes as well such as the Zagawa pastoralists who attempted to claim land 
from the Fur tribes and its farmers. It was also during this period in which the armed banditry 
in the region started to become prominent, mostly as a result of many of the pastoralists loosing 
most or all of their animals as a result of the drought and desertification and in turn raided 
others to restock their herds. By 1990 these moderate clashes between the different tribes in 
Darfur had evolved into full-scale conflict between the Fur and Arab communities. This 
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conflict also started to take on a more political dimension in the sense that rather than 
attempting to defuse the tensions and attempt to settle the conflict, the government in 
Khartoum actually served to intensify the conflict by arming the Arab tribes and neglecting to 
address the underlying core issue of the conflict over resources. In the early stages this core 
underlying issue could still be identified as the “need for rule of law and socio-economic 
development in the region” (Human Rights Watch, 2004).  
 
The current war in Darfur which officially broke out in 2003 therefore has deep historical roots 
and can be seen as “the latest configuration of a protracted problem” (Human Rights Watch, 
2004). However, the current conflict is also drastically different to any of these previous 
conflicts in that it has developed along strict and serious racial and ethnic lines and it provides 
a serious risk of completely shattering the historical patterns of co-existence in the region of 
Darfur. Many of the different ethnic groups which have previously been neutral toward one 
another have now positioned themselves along the Arab/African divide, aligning and 
cooperating either with the rebel movements or the government and its allied militia (the 
janjaweed). It is also becoming harder and harder for neutral groups to position themselves 
outside of the conflict.  
 
It is possible to argue that the emergence and use of the Janjaweed by the government in 
Khartoum marked the first instance of this new war in Darfur. The Janjaweed, literally 
meaning “evil spirit on horse back” has been an established militia faction since the early 
1990s and had as their main adversaries the Fur tribes and their civilian support bases. In 
retaliation to the atrocities being committed against them, a Fur militia was also emerging, 
largely through extensive contact with the Sudan’s People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in the 
South. The Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), which later became the Sudan Liberation Army 
(SLA) was the most prominent of these and was partly armed by the former president Habre in 
Chad. By the late 1990s this form of self-defense units to protect farms and families had 
developed into something different altogether. The SLA had now evolved into an organized 
rebel group which was able to efficiently mobilize resources and support from local 
populations. In 2001, the Zeghawa tribes, whose villages had also been ransacked by the 
Arabs, joined the Fur against their old Arab allies and so further strengthened the SLA in 
Darfur (Kajee, 2006: 81).  
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Between 2001 and 2004 the SLA insurgencies had begun to drastically increase in frequency 
and in extent with the SLA and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) often attacking 
government garrisons in joint missions. In turn, the government, unused to this form of guerilla 
warfare conducted by the rebels groups, unleashed its air force to bomb the rebels from above. 
The watershed mark in the Darfur was when the SLA joined by Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) attacked a state air base in Darfur’s provincial capital El Fasher on 25 April 
2003. The rebels were successful in destroying government army equipment, ranging from 
bombers to helicopter gun ships and also managed to take prisoners, arms and vehicles (Kajee, 
2006: 81).  
 
In turn, Khartoum’s reaction to this was to use the air force and the Janjaweed (which by that 
time had been trained and organized into effective paramilitary units) in what is known as a 
counter-insurgency strategy. The main conduct under this strategy was, and still is today, the 
bombing, burning and looting of villages, ensuring that the rebels are cut of from their civilian 
support base. In recent months, however, the atrocities committed by rebel groups have also 
increased and it has become increasingly difficult for aid workers and peacekeepers to 
distinguish between pro-government and rebel groups and to determine which of the two are 
responsible for the acts of violence. This blurring of different war parties is result of different 
actors adopting similar strategies in order to finance their war efforts and to simply keep 
themselves and their followers afloat (Kajee, 2006: 81).     
 
1.2      Research Problem  
 
Because of the effect that it has had on innocent civilians, the crisis in Darfur has perhaps 
attracted more media and scholarly attention in the last few years than any other conflict region 
in Africa since the Rwandan genocide. In some corners of the Western world the conflict has 
become intricately bound with campaigns and peace rallies organized by a diverse array of 
actors ranging from scholars to civil society to even celebrities, all making the headlines of 
large news and media networks across the globe. This may be good and well, yet it is also 
worth noting the common tendency of these news and media networks of oversimplifying the 
conflict in Darfur and in the greater Sudan. The hard fact is that civil unrest, such as the 
conflict playing out in Darfur, can hardly be framed as orderly and as one-dimensional” as is 
often done by the media (Kajee, 2006: 74).  
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So far the conflict in Darfur has commonly been framed as ethnic hatred or an ethnic cleansing 
of African by Arabs whereas the long war in Sudan has commonly been framed as the result of 
violent animosity between Muslims in the North and Christians in the South of the country.  
Although both of these deductions bear a certain mark of truth, they nonetheless neglect to 
account for various other actors and factors, both local, regional and international, which 
contribute to the root causes of the violent conflict (Kajee, 2006: 71).The most serious problem 
of this over-simplistic framing of the conflict in Darfur is the likelihood that this framework 
might be directly transferred or projected onto the peace process and would therefore have 
grave implications for the success of the peace negotiations. Although it might prove hard to 
establish, it is certainly possible that the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) has often been 
branded as a failure partly because of an over-simplistic analysis of the actors and factors 
involved. (Kajee, 2006: 74).  
 
The name Darfur is derived from the words “Dar”- meaning the land or the kingdom, and 
“Fur”- referring to one of the large tribes with the oldest standing historical roots in the region. 
In the literal sense Darfur means the Kingdom of the Fur people, yet what this literal definition 
conceals is the fact that Darfur is really the home of a much broader array of ethnic, cultural 
and linguistic communities and tribes. The province of Darfur, roughly the size of France, has, 
more or less, eight million inhabitance which consists of about eighty different tribes of which 
the most prominent include the Fur, Zeghawa, Tunjur, Berti, and Marsalit as well Arab groups 
such as the Rizeigat, Salamat and Bendi Halba (Kajee, 2006: 74)  
 
As mentioned, in the contemporary context the main division among these various groups (or 
tribes) relate to their lifestyle, or rather, their livelihood, as opposed to their race. Two main 
divisions are commonly identified, namely: sedentary farmers and semi-nomadic pastoralists. 
Although this division can hardly be considered as clear cut, it can nonetheless be considered a 
division between Arab tribes (relying mostly on cattle and camel herding) and non-Arab tribes 
(relying mostly on agriculture) (Kajee, 2006: 75).  It should be pointed out that all these tribes 
of Darfur share the same religion (Islam), and while some of the tribes do possess their own 
language, Arabic is generally spoken (International Commission of Inquiry in Darfur, 2005). 
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The “looseness” of this division, however, becomes apparent when one looks at the centuries 
of intermarriage between these groups, with the end result being that the notion of “Arab” and 
“African” remains exactly that: notional- something which perhaps has its roots in a 
contemporary context rather than in a primordial sentiment. Another example may also 
illustrate this point. Up until quite recently it was quite common for members of the Fur tribe 
to purchase and herd cattle and in the same process to “become Bagara” and to adopt the 
livelihood commonly associated with cattle-herding Arabs. Furthermore, even though most 
analysts regard the Fur people as the original or the first indigenous inhabitance of the region, 
the reality is that the Fur people themselves are the result of migration and assimilation starting 
from the fourteenth century. In the pre-colonial times it was very common for weaker tribes to 
assimilate and “become Fur” as a result of both conquest and religious and linguistic 
acculturization (Kajee, 2006: 75), (Cook, 2006: 123). The chapters to follow will elaborate 
extensively on how fixed these identities are in reality.  
 
1.3      Research Question 
 
To question to rise at this point is: how is it possible for people and communities who have a 
positive history of cooperation and tolerance to suddenly plunge into a situation of such cruelty 
and hate towards one another? Such were the scenes that played out in the civil wars in 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia when friends and neighbors started to violently unleash 
their aggression onto one another. This is also the scene we are currently witnessing in Darfur. 
When the actors involved in these conflicts, whether victims or aggressors, are questioned 
about their experiences of the atrocities committed against them, or by them, the common 
response usually lies in a difference between “us” and “them” explanation. This “us” and 
“them” dichotomy, or “othering” (as it is often referred to), is usually expressed in terms of 
ethnicity and/or ethnic labeling. It is true that ethnic sentiments may inspire groups and 
communities to act in violent ways towards certain people whom they classify as “other”. The 
problem, however, lies in detecting the “empirical basis of the sentiment” (Turton, 1997:78).  
The study therefore questions the popular argument that ethnic conflict arises out of an 
“ancient hatred” or “tribal warfare”.  
 
Ethnic tensions and disputes have existed in Darfur for centuries, yet despite this the Darfuri’s 
have managed to live in relative peace until recently. As shown in the introduction, in recent 
times these tensions have to a large extent been exacerbated by drought and famine. On top the 
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environmental considerations, one should also consider the possibility of political 
manipulation, both from the center in Khartoum and from neighboring states such as Libya, 
and how these actors may have played a role in shaping and exacerbating the conflict. The 
Khartoum government, as late as 2006, keeps insisting that the Darfur conflict is an inter-tribal 
one that has become much worst purely because of successive droughts and famine. This is 
clearly not all there is to the conflict when one looks at the way in which the government has 
bombed the villages of Darfur with official army aircrafts. Furthermore, the co-option of the 
Janjaweed into the regular army cannot be explained according an “ethnic hatred” or “tribal 
war” argument and therefore requires a study on Darfur to consider other factors not taken into 
account by the mainstream media. Recent UN reports found “credible information that the 
government of Sudan continues to support the Janjaweed through the provision of weapons and 
vehicles. The Janjaweed/ armed militias appear to have upgraded their modus operandi from 
horses, camels and AK-47s to land cruisers, pickup trucks and rocket-propelled 
grenades…Their continued access to ammunition and weapons is evident in their ability to co-
ordinate with the Sudanese armed forces in perpetrating attacks on villages and to engage in 
armed conflict with rebel groups” (United Nations, 2006: paragraph 76).  
 
The study therefore draws a clear relationship between ethnicity and war. With this 
relationship, however, it is also important to question whether ethnic differences and ethnic 
conflicts is something that is given by nature or whether it is constructed and manipulated by 
politicians to achieve political and economical gains. In order to shed light on this particular 
relationship between ethnicity and war it would therefore be essential to point to the conditions 
and historical circumstances under which ethnicity is actually brought to consciousness.  In 
tracing the historical and contextual origins of the idea of ethnicity scholars are often in 
disagreement as to whether ethnicity is simply a new term for describing something which has 
been present since the beginning of civilization, or whether ethnicity should be considered a 
“modern phenomenon”.  This disagreement runs parallel to the question of whether the conflict 
in Darfur should be seen as the result of ethnic hatred or whether it should be seen as having 
contemporary political causes, or both.  
 
Gellner (1964: 149) provides a definition of ethnicity which is consistent with the idea that 
ethnicity is a universal phenomena, something inherent in every human, when he says that: 
“ethnicity is “the human need to belong, to identify and hence also to exclude”. Such a 
definition, however, proves to be very vague and it is possible to argue that this “need” may 
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well be satisfied in a variety of other different ways which do not necessarily relate to 
ethnicity. Turton argues that it is precisely this vagueness of the idea of ethnicity that makes it 
a powerful tool for politicians to move individuals to collective action (Turton, 1997: 80). 
Therefore, Looking at “modern ethnicity”, one has to see it as some form of a reaction to 
mainly “political and economical processes which [we] take to be characteristic of modernity” 
(Turton, 1997: 80). Chapter two will expand extensively on the different views which different 
scholars hold regarding ethnicity and the role it plays in the modern warfare context.  
 
This criticism is close to the view which holds that ethnicity has been reconstructed for 
political purposes and corresponds closely to the instrumentalist conception of ethnicity, 
according to which nationalist movements “reinvent particular versions of history and memory 
to construct new cultural forms that can be used for political mobilization”.  Scholars such as 
Brown (2001: 4) would argue that what happened in Sudan may possibly be described as a 
diminishing capacity or perhaps even a form of disintegration of the state at the provincial level 
and perhaps also at the national level, forcing it to play the ethnic card in order to maintain 
control and legitimacy. Defining the state in the Weberian sense as the organization which 
“successfully upholds the monopoly of legitimate organized violence”, it should be possible to 
trace, first the collapse of legitimacy in Darfur and, secondly, the collapse of the monopoly of 
organized violence, as this paper will attempt to verify in the chapter to follow (Kaldor, 2006). 
 
In order for the study to shed light on the “ethnic hatred and/or tribal warfare” argument 
regarding ethnic conflict it would have to critically study the actors involved and the factors 
which drive their violent motives.  Young (1985: 72) points to the important role that the 
unequal distribution of economic, educational and other benefits of modernization plays, this 
usually as the result of the favoring of some regions and groups and, in turn, the 
marginalization and neglect of other areas and groups. Another factor too consider here is the 
concentration of political power at the states’ center which has as a direct result the provision 
of an arena where ethnic groups could become competing and often conflicting interest groups 
(Young, 1985: 75). This transformation of ethnic groups into interest groups is a factor worth 
emphasizing, for it is a factor that has greatly contributed to the profiting and exacerbation of 
ethnic tensions and conflict. What we see today in many conflict regions is a “transition from a 
non-competitive to a competitive form of ethnicity or political tribalism” (Lonsdale, 1994). 
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1.4 Purpose and significance of the study 
 
So far the paper has been preoccupied with lying out the fundamental dimensions of the 
conflict of which the most important is the notion of identity and how identity in the Darfur 
conflict seems to parallel the notion of ethnicity and ethnic consciousness. As mentioned, the 
problem lies with detecting the empirical basis for this ‘new’ form of ethnic consciousness and 
ethnic “othering” and it is therefore important to question whether the ethnic hatred 
explanation amount to a sufficient explanation regarding the root causes of the conflict, or for 
most other 21st century conflicts for that matter. The study therefore questions the single logic 
or “ethnic hatred” explanation for war and aims to examine the conflict in Darfur based the 
idea that a single simplified answer such as ethnic hatred may not prove sufficient in discussing 
the root causes of civil war. In order to answer this question the study will consider the 
argument that the concept of ethnicity is a instrumental notion, a tool which may be easily 
wielded by desperate politicians eager to hold on to power and authority. The study will 
therefore attempt describe how certain individuals might manipulate different groups along 
ethnic lines and the effect this has on conflict in the region and the nation as a whole.  
 
Such an inquiry will necessarily require the paper to firstly, analyze the various actors 
involved- their history, their origins, their motivation, their grievance, their opponents and their 
strategies. Secondly, the study will have to critically inquire into the functioning of the state, 
both locally, regionally and nationally, for it is within the context of the state, or rather the 
disintegration of the state that these actors operate. In line with the arguments presented by 
scholars such as de Waal (2007), Flint (2005) and Turton (2006), this study will explore the 
notion that all activity within the conflict in Darfur is derived, in some way or another, from 
political and or state disintegration and, therefore, inadequacy. What is meant by inadequacy in 
this context is the underdevelopment, the marginalization, and the brutalization which occur in 
Darfur on behalf of the ruling (and desperate) factions of the country, factors which have 
undoubtedly shaped and possibly caused the current war in Darfur. According to this view, 
most of the factors which led to the war in Darfur can be considered within the context of the 
state and the actors involved in its confines. Individuals and groups will be examined in terms 
of their relation to the state and one another.  
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As mentioned, various other explanations exist regarding the origin of violent conflicts, of 
which the most prominent include the greed and/or grievance argument, ethnicity and the 
environmental scarcity argument. It is certainly possible to construct an explanation for the 
conflict in Darfur along these lines of argument, yet instead, the thesis will employ a more 
specific framework through which to explain the conflict. In this framework no particular actor 
or factor will form the primary unit of analysis, instead, various factors and actors will be 
considered and analyzed in the context of the state and ethnic conflict. As is apparent in the 
information provided above, Darfur has had a share of resource disputes which to some extent 
has shaped its present state of affairs and probably also its future direction, including the 
mingling of resource conflicts and ethnic conflict. The main question, however, is where 
resource conflicts end and where ethnic conflict begins. This question is of great importance 
because it will determine if and to what extent the Sudanese Government, the Janjaweed or the 
liberation movements are responsible for transforming minor resource conflicts into a new, 
modern warfare for political gains (Salih, 2005). 
 
1.5      Theoretical Framework 
 
When looking beyond Darfur at the contemporary international political arena (referring to the 
post-communist context in this paper), it becomes apparent that the greater majority of wars 
playing out take place within national borders as apposed wars between states. As Darfur 
clearly illustrates, one of the most alarming consequences of this reality has been the increase 
of the amount of refugees in different regions of the world. Statistics released on this subject 
reveal that the number of total refugees in the world have risen from 2 million in 1970 to well 
over 16 million in 1995. Included in these statistics are also more or less 21 million people 
which have been displaced within their own countries’ (International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies, 1996: 131). According to Turton (1997) these internal wars are 
fought primarily with light weapons which a very easily available at very affordable prices and 
affects mainly the lives and livelihoods of civilians. Another characteristic of these wars are the 
fact that are generally waged not against a united enemy but rather, they are waged against 
neighbors, friends and relatives (Turton, 1997: 80). 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s many scholars have started to notice this changing nature of 
conflicts by comparing these conflict to conflict during the cold war era and to conflicts even 
prior to that. As mentioned, part of this changing nature of violent conflicts is the growth or 
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increase of civil wars or what some refer to as “low intensity wars” (Van Creveld, 1991) and 
what other refer to as intra-state armed conflict (Kaldor, 2006). These intra-state conflicts can 
be contrasted to the inter-state wars which were characteristic of the era preceding the demise 
of communism. Leender, (2007: 960) argues that these types of conflicts “warrants new 
analytical frameworks for the study of the motives and nature of combatants, the techniques 
and channels they use to sustain themselves and to acquire resources to confront their 
opponents and the implications of these practices for non-combatants, the notion of the state, 
and international efforts at conflict resolution”.   
 
Perhaps the most definitive version of this new framework is presented by scholars such as 
Mary Kaldor (2006), Martin van Creveld (1991) and Helfried Münkler (2005) who uses the 
concept of “new wars” which they place in opposition to conventional or “old wars” fought 
between states by armed forces in uniform and where violence continued to be “monopolized 
and applied by states according to certain rules, with their ability to exert territorial control at 
stake” (Leender, 2007: 976). Kaldor (2006) argues that new wars take place in the context of 
the disintegration of the state and that they are fought by networks of both state and non-state 
actors who direct their violence mostly against civilians. Furthermore, proponents of this new 
warfare framework also points to the fact that on the battlefield it is not a decisive victory that 
is pursued but, instead, the creation of new political identities (mostly ethnic or tribal 
identities) based on a “perpetual sense of fear and hatred” (Leender, 2007: 976). As a result, 
one of the key characteristics of the new wars is that they blur the distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants, between public and private actors, between political and 
criminal violence and between legitimate trade and illegal war-related modes of generating 
revenues (Kaldor, 2005: 493).  This framework therefore seems highly suitable for this 
particular study on Darfur in that it relates to the key problems and questions raised so far.  
 
The new war framework will help the study in explaining the conflict in Darfur whereby the 
main consideration will be if and how politicians use ethnicity as a tool in order to mobilize 
their followers in the context of the disintegration of the state and if and how they construct 
new political identities (mostly ethnic or tribal identities) based on a perpetual sense of fear and 
hatred. Such an analysis would require the paper to focus on the motives and nature of 
combatants, the techniques and channels they use to sustain themselves and to acquire 
resources to confront their opponents and the implications of these practices for non-
combatants. The paper will also bring into question the notion of the state and its role in 
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inducing conflict, for as mentioned, it is within the context of the weak state (or the erosion of 
the autonomy of the state) in which the actors mentioned so far conduct their violence.  
 
The war in Darfur and this paper’s analysis of the war may therefore serve as a means for 
scholars to determine more accurately whether ethnic conflicts are a byproduct of the political 
structure of a country and its polity or whether it arises out of an ancient ethnic hatred context. 
In the case of Darfur there exists a stanch assembly of scholars who views the countries 
fundamental political problem as the “excessive power held by a disproportionately wealthy 
elite in Khartoum” which exploits and subjugates the countries the countries provinces (de 
Waal, 2007:3). According to this view, the conflict in Darfur should be seen as a result of the 
various ways in which the centre preys on and marginalizes the peripheries, with racial, ethnic, 
and religious conflicts being a result or a “secondary theme” to these dynamics.  
 
This view would then also see the regions identity as being defined by means of a racial 
labeling preferred by a small minority situated in the centre (de Waal, 2007:3). If one applies 
this center-periphery paradigm in combination with another social reality of Sudan, that of 
persistent instability at the center of power, it becomes possible to question whether many of 
the crisis exhibited by Sudan, both current and historical, are not perhaps a direct result of the 
combination of these two realities. All the characteristics of the Darfur conflict such as the 
brutalization of society, the violent disputes over land, the opportunistic behavior of provincial 
political elites, the militarization of tribal administration, and the local ethnic or tribal conflicts 
may possibly be traced back to the impact of this political reality (de Waal, 2007:3). This idea 
serves as an example of some of the alternative explanation which exists regarding the root 
cause of the conflict and will be further explored in the chapters to follow, along with various 
other possible explanations or factors.   
 
1.6      Research Objectives 
 
The purpose of this study is to consider the argument that the war in Darfur (and most other 
21st century conflicts for that matter) arose in the context of the disintegrating state and plays 
out in the form of violent ethnic animosity between different groups, this being the result of 
ethnic manipulation by powerful politician and elite losing their grip on state power and 
patronage. It is therefore appropriate to conduct the study within qualitative paradigm. What 
the qualitative approach will allow the paper is the ability to study a situation or a phenomena 
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such as the conflict in Darfur and to gain an understanding of the underlying reasons and 
motives for the attitudes, actions and behavior of individuals and groups. Via the qualitative 
approach the paper will therefore attempt to comprehend the issue and complexities that forms 
the root of the conflict in Darfur. More so, it will provide insight into the context within which 
different actors function, allowing the study to gain insights into the different perspectives 
which each of the different actors hold (Babbie & Mouton, 2006).  
 
The nature of this study will be mainly descriptive. The descriptive method will allow the 
study to describe the situation in Darfur as well as to identify and highlight the primary 
characteristics of the conflict. This descriptive method will enable the thesis to determine who 
the main actors are, what the main factors are, what their relation to one another represents to 
the study and how the identified actors accomplish their goals and to what effect and extent. 
The study will also mainly rely on secondary sources of information via the analysis of existing 
literature, yet primary sources such as official diplomatic publications, field reports, and 
research papers published by humanitarian and relief organizations such as Human Rights 
Watch and International Crisis Group will also be used throughout the study. The secondary 
sources which will be used include mainly academic journal articles, publications, books, and 
media reports (Babbie & Mouton, 2006).  
 
1.7      Limitation and Delimitations  
 
The study must also admit to some limitations and delimitations. The first limitation imposed 
upon the study is one related to time and space considerations. Due to the geographical 
distance and the financial constraint, the study will be unable to conduct extensive field work 
or detailed data analysis and therefore relies heavily on written records. Another limitation is 
presented by the fact that some literature is only available in Arabic and not in English, which 
is the language which this study will be conducted in.  
 
In terms of delimitations, the content of this study will only focus on Darfur’s political 
and/ethnic conflict since 1989 up until the 2007 deployment of the joint UN and AU forces in 
Darfur. The reason for the 1989 delimitation is that the new war framework which this study 
employs focuses exclusively on in intra-state conflicts occurring in the post-communist 
context, seeing that this is when the phenomena started to become documented. As for the 
2007 delimitation, very little new and original data and literature have been published beyond 
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this joint AU and UN military deployment period. Although various historical factors and 
references will be mentioned, the primary focus will remain within the post-communist 
context. The focus on the study will also remain on the conflict in Darfur. Although some 
comparisons will be drawn between Darfur and other conflict regions such as Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia, the empirical analysis will focus mostly on Darfur and the greater state of 
Sudan.     
 
1.8      Chapter Outline  
 
Chapter 1, which serves as the introductory chapter, presents the subject and the primary focus 
of this study. In short, the thesis has three primary objectives which are all briefly raised in this 
chapter. Firstly, the paper seeks to describe the conflict in Darfur and to shed light on its origin 
and its root causes. Secondly, by describing the conflict the study will attempt to shed more 
understanding on the nature of ethnic warfare in general. The aim of the study is to determine 
whether the conflict in Darfur, and most other 21st century conflicts for that matter, is the result 
of “ethnic hatred” or whether there are contemporary political forces which better explain the 
conflict’s ethnic character. Lastly, this chapter briefly outlines the new war framework which 
the study will employ. This framework provides a good lens through which to view most intra-
state conflict and will assist the study in laying out the fundamental components of the Darfur 
conflict and so better enable the study to answer the research question.  
 
Chapter 2 will serve as the theoretical chapter. In this chapter the paper will define and explain 
exactly what is meant under the new war framework. The work of various scholars will be 
considered here in an attempt to find a general outline of what the new wars entail. The most 
prominent of these scholars include Mary Kaldor (2006), Helfried Münkler (2007), and Martin 
van Creveld (1991). The new wars will be described in terms of their characteristics, their 
conduct, the actors involved in these wars, the context within which these wars occur and the 
effect which they have on participants and non-participants. The aim is to construct a clear 
framework with which the conflict in Darfur can be analyzed. The last section of chapter 2 will 
also elaborate on the discussion between the primordial views on ethnicity compared to the 
instrumentalist views on ethnicity. Here the paper will consider the views which different 
scholars hold regarding ethnic conflict and ethnic consciousness. The most prominent scholars 
under this discussion include Young (1985), Brown (2001), Gat (2006) Huntington (1996) and 
Conteh-Morgan (2004). Importantly, the paper will attempt to illustrate the compatibility 
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between the instrumentalist view on ethnicity and the new war framework. This chapter will 
therefore also serve as a literature review where the arguments of different opposing authors 
will be considered and compared. Different theoretical approaches will be considered in an 
attempt to find the most appropriate lens through which to view the conflict in Darfur.  
 
Chapter 3 will provide, firstly, the background to the conflict in Darfur. An overview and 
chronological description of the conflict will be provided where the study will briefly focus on 
various historical stages of the development of the conflict. Although the study is delimited to 
the period after 1989, it cannot neglect to mention various historical factors which helped to 
shape the current situation in Darfur. Secondly, the chapter will also provide an overview of all 
the main actors involved in the conflict and the specific role which each of these actors fulfill 
in the war. The most important actors which will be discussed include the Sudanese 
government and its regular military force, two rebel groups (JEM and SLA), the Janjaweed, 
and certain international actors such as Chad, Libya, and China.  
 
Chapter 4 will focus on the factors involved in the Darfur conflict. Having discussed the state 
as one of the important actors in the conflict in chapter 3, chapter 4 will elaborate further on the 
role of the state and the government as key factors in explaining the conflict and also in 
explaining how the government has played a great role in shaping the conflict along ethnic 
line. This, in turn, will shed light on the question of whether the conflict arose out of ethnic 
hatred as the primordialists would argue or whether the conflict should be seen in terms of the 
instrumentalist argument which claim that governments, intellectuals and elite are largely 
responsible for the violent ethnic mobilization occurring in many regions of the world. Some of 
the factors which will be discussed in this chapter includes the state in terms of its weak center, 
its over-dominant center and its persistent instability. Other factors which will be discussed, 
also within the context of the state, include factors such as under-development, 
marginalization, lack of service delivery in regions such as Darfur. This chapter will also study 
the militarization of ethnicity and critically look into the way in which ethnic mobilization 
occurred in Darfur, focusing on the main factors and actors lying behind ethnic mobilization in 
Darfur.  
 
Chapter 5 (the conclusion) will summarize the findings which were made during the study. 
More so, this chapter will analyze to what extent the actors and the factors mentioned during 
this study contributed the causes of the conflict in Darfur. The aim of this chapter is to 
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conclusively establish whether the war in Darfur is a result of ethnic hatred or whether the 
answer to the research question lies in more recent political misconduct. Also, this chapter will 
also attempt to establish to what extent the conflict in Darfur constitutes a new war (as defined 
by Kaldor, van Vreveld, and Münkler). If the conflict indeed fits into the new war framework 
then it would be possible to draw various broad conclusions regarding the origins of the 
conflict, its conduct and possible suggestion regarding its future. In this chapter the research 
question will therefore be evaluated in terms of its validity and the study should be able to 
answer this research question raised in the introduction chapter. This would also allow the 
study to make suggestions regarding changes and/or alternative approaches in dealing with 
conflict such as Darfur.  
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Chapter 2:             Ethnic Conflict- Theoretical Perspectives 
 
2.1    Two approaches to ethnic conflict: Primordialism and Instrumentalism   
 
Ethnic identity is a feature of almost all modern wars to the extent that an enemy has to 
somehow be identified by a name or a title. So too, in order for international observers to make 
sense of a war, ethnic identity seem to provide the most comprehensible form of identification 
of different parties. Ellis (2003: 1) notes, however, that applying ethnic labels is not the same 
thing as saying that wars are caused by ethnicity. Put differently, ethnic labelling is often used 
as both a description and an explanation at the same time, this according to Ellis (2003: 2), 
often as a “substitute for a more thorough analysis”. The big problem with this logic of 
labelling a war as “ethnic” or “rooted in ancient hatred” is that it may serve as a way for 
observers to distance themselves from the war in terms of intervention or what Ellis calls “an 
unwillingness to act”. Similarly, when one claims that war should be viewed via a purely 
modern political lens, ignoring the ancient ethnic hostility argument, one may also possibly 
ignore a very important natural aspect of human aggression and of the nature of war itself. For 
the sake shedding some light on this disputed relationship between ethnicity and conflict, the 
section below will consider two different theoretical approaches when looking at the 
relationship between ethnicity and conflict.  
 
2.1.1     Primordialism  
 
Primordialism provides an explanation of ethnic identity which argues that there exists an 
ancient or primitive aspect of humanity which historically, or rather evolutionary, dictates 
human conduct. A primordialist would therefore argue that violent conflicts should be 
explained as a result of traditional cultural differences such as language, religion, and race. The 
phenomenon where people exhibit fierce identification with a certain ethnicity is an historical 
process which has its roots in human evolution, as opposed to being the result of modern 
political construct. Primordialists often explain the resurging wave of fierce ethnic and 
religious conflicts witnessed in the 21st century as the result the failure of modernizing 
ideologies and the failure of the modern state in various regions of the world and the resulting 
backlash of alternative ethnic groups who stand on the less prosperous end of modernity.  
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Although the idea of modernity and its glorious assumptions have come into question for some 
time already, most notably by post-modernists, and is therefore nothing new, primordialists 
nonetheless critically opposes the ideas modernizing ideology puts forth. Modernization is the 
idea that humanity and its governing structures have evolved beyond the ‘uncivilized’ and 
‘barbaric’ form where elements such as religion and culture constitute a form of conflict, and 
that, instead, the human order have moved towards greater unity, freedom, and liberty. Cultural 
exclusivity and tradition is seen by modernizing theorists as inhibiting progress, and it is 
acknowledged only in the layer of humanity which the civilized world have already shed. 
Primordialists stand in direct opposition to modernists when they proclaim that cultural 
differences, meaning factors such as religion, language, race, and degree of civilization, are 
exactly the reason why modern political conflict remains such a prevailing reality.  
 
Two of the most prominent primordialists  today are Azar Gat with the book War in Human 
Civilization (2006) and Samuel Huntington with the famous article The Clash of Civilizations 
(1996). Although both of these scholars are primordialists, they differ remarkably in their 
approach to conflict. Huntington firmly believes that factors such as race, kinship, religion, or 
broadly speaking, culture, should be seen as one of the key independent variables when 
looking at violent conflict, whether intra-state or inter-state. Put differently, he believes that the 
essential ingredient in conflict is cultural. The following quote by Huntington illustrates the 
basis upon which his ideas rest: “cultural similarities and differences between nations produce 
converging and diverging state interests that lead to nations forming alliances around 
cosmologies” (1996). Huntington’s focus lies more at the national level, yet his argument may 
be equally valid for intra-state ethnic conflicts. There is no dispute that since the end of the 
Cold War the world has seen a remarkable increase in ethnic conflicts with identities becoming 
one of the main factors in these violent conflicts. Huntington’s primordialist approach to 
ethnicity and ethnic conflict is similar to that of Keen (2000) when he argue that this great 
growth in these ethnic conflicts since the end of the cold war should be explained as the result 
of “ethnic, tribal, and national rivalries” being kept on hold by the hard regimes of the Cold 
War, and that with the end of these regimes, those hidden feelings were able to re-emerge 
(Keen, 2000: 20).   
 
Huntington therefore has a rather rigid take on culture and civilization, arguing that existing 
cultural identities and forms of civilizations are extremely hard or impossible to bend or alter. 
They form the basic building block on which human societies are built and are unlikely to 
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change. In fact, Huntington predicts that the future wars of the 21st century will be almost 
exclusively based on cultural differences, wars between the “us” and “them”, differences 
which have developed over the history in human civilization. If one were to look at the war in 
Darfur using Huntington’s framework, one would take the African/Arab divide as one of the 
crucial independent variables in explaining the conflict (Huntington, 1993).  
 
Most primordialists agree on one specific aspect of the ethnic phenomena: the fact that “ethnic 
communities are persistent, resilient, robust, and capable of eliciting deep loyalty, intense 
attachment and strong motivation, and, in consequence, are particularly resistant to change” 
(Horowitz 2001). Another notable primordialist scholar, Walker Connor, argues that this 
“resilience” of ethnic solidarity and the strength of ethnic belonging is an expression of a deep 
emotional feeling associated with ethnicity which has psychological roots in kinship bonds. 
Connor (1994) argues that “phenomena-logically speaking, ethnic feeling is a descent-
orientated, quasi-kinship sense of belonging, incorporating a sense of shared blood”. Connor 
therefore argues that the strength and persistence of ethnic communities remains so prevailing 
precisely because it is a socio-psychological fact that kinship and blood-ties tend to produce 
strong, intense and long lasting bonding. Along with this, kin-ties also generate a sense of 
ethnic opposition. Primordialists would make the argument that because of a belief in a 
common decent amongst an ethnic group, the bond between these members would therefore 
always divide humanity into a form of “us” and them”. Connor, however, does not explain the 
origins and science behind these kinship and blood ties, he merely acknowledges them as 
important variables. Another author, Azar Gat, fills the gaps which Connor and Huntington 
leaves open.  
 
Also a primordialist, Azar Gat, takes a different approach by looking at the root causes of 
violent conflict and aggression. In his study, however, he reveals a lot about ethnicity and the 
kinship and blood-tie phenomena. Gat begins his inquiry into the nature of human violence by 
asking the question: “did humans in their evolutionary natural environment and evolutionary 
way of life as hunter-gatherers fight? Was fighting an intrinsic aspect of their particular mode 
of adaptation, moulded by selective pressures for millions of years?” (2006: 5) Put differently, 
Gat questions whether man’s evolutionary path has made warfare “natural to humans”. The 
alternative to this hypothesis is: “did fighting come later, only after culture and the state really 
took off, and should therefore be seen as ‘unnatural’ to humans” (Gat, 2006: 5).  Gat basically 
delves into the furthest and most historical realms of humanity and, in the process, sheds light 
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on classic question of whether ethnic conflict is natural to humans or whether it should rather 
be seen as modern construction.  
 
Gat looks at what is known as “primitive hunter-gatherer societies” dating from the upper 
Palaeolithic Age (35-000 – 15-000) and attempts to establish whether fighting is truly intrinsic 
to the human mode of adaptation. As can be expected, data on the subject field is very illusive 
and therefore, he mostly relies on account held on Australia’s Aboriginals and North-west 
American Indians, these hunter-gatherer societies all possessing a degree of isolation and lack 
of material possession making them suitable for the study of groups operating outside the 
realms of civilization. He argues that these tribes offer a good laboratory for the phenomena of 
fighting before agriculture and the state. After a thorough analysis he concludes that fighting 
was not a recent invention, associated with the emergence of sedentary settlement such as food 
storage, property and high population density but is, if fact, a phenomena which has been 
present long before the emergence culture or civilizational structures (Gat, 2006).  
 
This conclusion that warfare is not a late cultural invention, firstly, marks a divorce between 
Gat and other primordialist scholars such as Huntington who base their central arguments on 
strictly cultural considerations. Secondly, it forces him to explain in what way warfare is innate 
in human nature. For this he turns to Darwinism. Darwin’s evolutionary theory is centred on 
the idea that “organisms evolve blindly by natural selection, which takes place in their struggle 
for survival against environmental conditions and, because successful proliferation, also 
against each other for scarce resources” (Gat, 2006: 42). Applying Darwin’s theory, Gat argues 
that violence and deadly aggression is innate in human nature, but only as “a skill, potential, 
propensity, or disposition”. What this means is that genes are therefore more a general design 
plan, open to environmental influences, rather than “a ready made menu for action” (Gat, 2006: 
41). This means that aggression is therefore both innate and optional in humans and that 
violent aggression levels actually fluctuate in response to certain conditions. The following 
quote by Gat sums up the above: “deadly aggression is a major evolution-shaped, innate 
potential that, given the right conditions, has always been easily triggered” (Gar, 2006: 41). 
Before turning to what these conditions are, a deeper look into Gat’s views on kinship and 
blood-ties are required.  
 
The basic idea which Gat takes from Darwinism is that one’s genes are passed on to the next 
generation not only through one’s own offspring but also through other close kin who share the 
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same genes (Hamilton, 1964). Siblings share on average 50% of their genes, the same 
percentage as parents and offspring. Half-siblings share, on average 25% of their genes, 
whereas cousins share 12.5% of their genes. This argument may be seen as the basis of the old 
idea that blood is thicker than water and also explains the idea of kinship and blood-ties, 
emphasized by Connor. Basically, one’s close kin “constitute a reservoir of his or her own 
genes, and are, therefore, evolutionary worth caring for and defending against all others, even 
at the risk of the individuals own survival”. This evolutionary rationale favors not individual 
survival but kin selection or “inclusive fitness” of the same genes in oneself and in one’s kin 
(Gat, 2006: 44). In evolutionary terms, it is ultimately the survival and propagation of the 
genes that count.  
 
Taking this argument further, the same logic which makes it evolutionary beneficial to 
sacrifice one’s life in order to save more than two siblings or eight cousins, hold true, 
according to Gat, for 32 second cousins, 128 third cousins, or 512 fourth cousins. This is pretty 
much what a regional group is, in terms of size, and it is the main reason why members of the 
group will prefer the other members of the group to outsiders. Therefore, the clans of one 
regional group will normally support each other against other regional groups with whom their 
genetic kin relationships are far more remote than they are within their own region group. This 
argument also explains what Gat calls “the cases of altruistic self-sacrifice” to save one’s 
people or a large number of them. One’s kin are generally recognized by a combination of 
various attributes such physical features (phenotype) and cultural attributes such as language. 
Cultural identity became a strong predictor of kinship. This is why humans are therefore so 
inclined to side with people who share the same culture against foreigners (Gat, 2006: 136).  
 
In the hunter-gatherer regional group, shared culture was a distinctive mark of kinship, as well 
as a strong basis for social cooperation. Gat argues that this inter-relationship of kinship, 
social-cooperation and culture constitutes the evolutionary root of ethnocentrism, xenophobia, 
patriotism, and nationalism (Druckman, 1995), (Gat, 2006: 136). The idea behind this 
statement is that with the coming of agriculture, civilization and modernity, “as shared-culture 
communities expanded a thousand- and even million fold, the sentiments of kin solidarity 
expanded far beyond its original evolutionary setting and scope”. Basically, an individual’s 
people or nation (which is according to Gat merely an extension of the original genetic cultural 
regional group) can “evoke the greatest devotion, indeed, fraternity within a motherland or 
fatherland, no matter how genetically related its members actually are” (Gat, 2006: 136). 
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Individuals are therefore actually prepared to risk and sacrifice themselves, not only under 
coercion but also voluntarily, for these “large shared-culture, semi-, and sometimes pseudo-, or 
imagined kin groups” or what Connor (1994) calls: a descent-orientated, quasi-kinship sense of 
belonging, incorporating and a sense of shared blood. 
 
As to the conditions required and the motivations for violent aggression and conflict, Gat 
argues that in the human state of nature, the human motivational complex consists of different 
mixtures of the certain scarcities for which people may resort to competition of which “both 
somatic and reproductive elements may be present with humans” (Gat, 2006: 56). Resource 
competition is a prime cause of aggression and deadly violence in nature. Food, water, and 
shelter are all important natural selection forces. The human tendency for maximizing 
reproduction was constantly checked by resource scarcity and competition. Another prime 
source of competition involves reproduction.  Among hunter-gatherers, reproductive 
opportunities were often a strong motive for warfare and often the main motive. The reason 
why women are such a strong motivational force is because reproductive opportunities are a 
very strong selective force, like resources. Violent conflict is therefore a means through which 
competition over reproductive opportunities is both expressed and resolved.  
 
Gat takes this point further by arguing how “from the primary somatic and reproductive aims, 
other, proximate and derivative, ‘second-level’, aims arise”. According to Gat, factors such as 
personal esteem, prestige, power and leadership positions may assist the individual who posses 
this recognition to reap somatic and reproductive advantages. The secondary factors are 
therefore also competed for and may take the form violent conflict. Another point which Gat 
makes, related to the above, is that competition and conflict often only breeds more 
competition and conflict. As mentioned, competition and conflict arise out of a basic state of 
scarcity, but then, because of the above mentioned second-level aims such and power, prestige 
and the resulting suspicion and insecurity which they create, competition and conflict starts to 
grow on itself and starts to take on a life of its own and often reaches a negative sum situation 
where defection seizes to become an option. War may therefore often take on a “self-
perpetuating and mutually damaging” aspect where a type of prisoners’ dilemma arises which 
may potentially mean net losses for both parties (Gat, 2006: 144).  
 
In summary, primordialism assumes a type of “cultural realism” stance, suggesting a sort of 
pessimism in human nature that often takes a military form in terms of inter-group cooperation. 
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This is very similar to the way in which realists would argue or theorize on interstate behavior.  
This pessimism in human nature can be seen as the result of certain attributes of human nature 
which primordialist assume as given by nature and dictated by evolution, attributes such as 
ethnocentrism, xenophobia and racism. Also, similar to realists, security dilemmas and 
balances of power among culture groups are therefore as important for primordialists as they 
are for realists. In certain circumstances, “group solidarity reinforces military capability (or 
supersedes it when, as is often the case, military resources are meager), and the intensification 
of group identity is viewed as both necessary to group survival and threatening to other 
groups”- a classic security dilemma at the regional group level (Henderson, 1997: 657).  
 
2.1.2     Instrumentalism  
 
Instrumentalism is generally applied as a means to illustrate how politicians and elite actors 
may use ethnicity as an instrument to further their political and economical interests. The 
factors which primordialist consider to be the root causes of conflicts, factors such as religion, 
race and ethnicity, are not excepted by instrumentalists as the causes of conflicts. Factors such 
as race, religion, or broadly speaking, ethnicity, are instead used as a force with which to 
mobilize people, a means to gain support for and justify the conflict. On its own, ethnicity is 
not seen as the cause of conflict. Instead, instrumentalists argue that the true and underlying 
causes of most violent conflicts are the result of political and economic factors, with politicians 
often being the actors behind the scene. When looking at the true motives for war, 
instrumentalist would argue that factors such as power and wealth play a much greater 
determining role, as opposed to cultural differences.  
 
As to the question of why people would be willing to support political entrepreneurs in the first 
place, it is often agreed that “individuals will consciously self-identify on the basis of ethnicity 
when ethnic membership to one or another group is perceived to be instrumental in accessing 
valued goods” (Hempel, 2006). Kaldor (2006) refers to this as “ethnic mobilization from 
below”. It is argued that the coming together of shared interests and shared identities promotes 
group solidarity, and so, provides the organizational means necessary to mobilize ethnic groups 
in pursuit or defense of the valued goods, be it land, access to resources or any other desired 
goods. Material incentives may therefore play a large role in the decision to adhere to political 
rhetoric. Various scholars therefore believe that the process of ethnic mobilization by political 
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entrepreneurs occurs more easily under certain condition such as extreme poverty, inequality, 
landlessness, and lack of political representation. Within these condition, it become much 
easier for politicians to sweep up masses by giving expression to these grievances via ethnic, 
religious or cultural means and, simultaneously providing material incentives from joining.   
 
Another argument also exists as to why individuals would consent to the ethnic or religious 
mobilization on behalf of political entrepreneurs. According to Hempel (2006), the “ethnic 
community” may also become increasingly relevant and important for individuals as they 
respond to resource shifts resulting from factors such as, for example, increased immigration, 
urbanization, unequal industrialization, and state expansion associated with modernization. The 
ethnic group then serves as an effective medium for accessing goods in these changing 
environments. Put differently, “ethnic groups may then become interest groups defined by 
ethnic boundaries” (Hempel, 2006: 2). The following quote by Weber (1996) provides a good 
summary of this argument: “ethnic membership does not constitute a group, it only facilitates 
group formation”. This is why instrumentalists argue that ethnic identities in this mode of 
analysis does not reflect traditional bonds based on one’s local place or kinship group but are, 
instead, build around wider distinctions based on language, race, religion, or region of origin, 
all of which provides a means for politicians to maintain a form cohesion when furthering their 
interests. As shown above, this is also made possible by providing the group members with 
access to valuable resources that they would not otherwise have been able to seize.  
 
Unlike the primordialists, therefore, instrumentalists argue that inter-cultural conflict does not 
emerge from any natural division of groups, but rather, should be seen as the result of elite 
manipulation of ethnic or nationalist appeals in pursuit of their own interests. Cultural 
differences, therefore, does not necessitate conflict, rather, it only makes it easier for elites and 
politicians to move their societies close to hostility and rivalry. Cultural dissimilarity in itself 
should not be associated with interstate war. One of the reasons often stated for this is the fact 
that, for example, groups to which people actually belong are not always the ones to which 
they would like to belong or feel loyalty for or whose standards they adopt. It is often argued 
that people have multiple, often crisscrossing identities. Also, one may find members of a 
group who are disloyal to or alienated by their membership groups, and there are also those 
who aspire to groups to which they do not belong or who “accept the evaluative standards of an 
external group” (Henderson, 1997: 656).   
 
25 
 
Many scholars therefore oppose the ideas which primordialist puts forth which implicitly 
accepts the argument that cultural or ethnic differences are the root cause of ethnic conflicts. 
Opponents of this view also point to the fact that there often exists great commonalities across 
intercultural spaces and, also, that there are usually long histories of cross-cultural cooperation 
among many of the present day antagonists. One example which may illustrate this point is 
provided by Gagnon (1995: 334) when he says that in the former Yugoslavia, Serbs and Croats 
hardly fought each other prior to this century. In fact, he adds that intermarriage rates were 
quite high even up to the 1980s. In addition to this, the former Yugoslavia never witnessed the 
religious wars that were experienced by Western and Central Europe. Examples such as these 
lead many scholars to conclude that conflict, such as the conflict among the Slavs, is neither 
ancient nor religiously based but rather primarily ideological and political (Henderson, 1997: 
650).  
Horowitz (1985) argues that “identities are not hard givens, but they are malleable”. What he 
means by this is that a form of attachment must exist in order for it to be exploited for the 
rational benefit of elites. He goes further by arguing that “passion and interest work 
conditionally and that ethnicity matters because it “can combine an interest with an effective 
tie”.  Young (1993) takes of from this argument by insisting that the best way of looking at 
ethnic conflicts, or what he refers to as “the dialectics of cultural pluralism”, is to combine the 
two approaches of instrumentalism and primordialism. According to Young, primordialism 
proves very helpful in completing instrumentalism in that it explains the strength of the 
personal and emotional sentiments through which interest is instrumentally pursued. In 
Young’s words: “it helps make comprehensible the emotionally latent in ethnic conflict, its 
disposition to arouse deep-seated anxieties, fears, and insecurities, or to trigger a degree of 
aggressiveness not applicable in purely material interest terms” (Young, 1993: 23). Young, 
however, leans more towards instrumentalism when he says that the atrocities that have been 
committed in many of the wars in Africa, Eastern Europe and various other places, all in the 
name of ethnicity, should rather be seen as "profound failures of statecraft" rather than as “the 
inevitable consequence of primordial ethnic loyalties coming into conflict”. 
If one excepts this argument by Young it is important to realize that in order for a group of 
people’s primordialist sentiment to be aroused and mobilized in the service of instrumentalist 
objectives, there must be some sort of a deep-rooted perception of, for example, injustice or 
discrimination in the collective psyche of the people. Why else would these sentiments surface 
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if not as a result of some sort of threatening condition imposed upon the group. Gurr (1998: 
123) argues that “ethno-political activism  is motivated by people’s deep-seated grievances 
about their collective status in combination with the situationally determined pursuit of 
political interests, as determined by group leaders and political entrepreneurs”. What is meant 
by this quote is that in order for an ethnic group to be mobilized to the extent of taking up arms 
and violently confronting another group as was done in Darfur, there has to be a very strong 
sense of grievance which is experienced or shared by the majority of that group.  
 
According to the Instrumentalists, one should therefore be careful to seek explanations for the 
so-called new wars in ethnicity or culture, no matter how ethnic or cultural they may be.   
Perhaps a more relevant way to examine causes is to look at the way power is organized, 
usually through a state. The Instrumentalists also argue that what the primordialist view fails to 
explain is why there where such long periods of coexistence of these different communities, or 
why these waves of ethnic consciousness take place at particular times. Instead, many scholars 
and analyst might argue that the current wave of ethnic consciousness has contemporary 
causes. These analysts would perhaps argue that the primordial view “amount to a kind of 
myopia, an excuse for inaction”, both on the part of the governments involved and the 
international community (Kaldor, 2007). 
 
In summary, instrumentalists suggest a greater degree of optimism in human nature (rooted in 
rationalism) that promotes cooperation (especially multi- cultural forms of democracy). If 
primordialist resembles a form of “cultural realism”, then instrumentalism assumes a “cultural 
idealist” position (Henderson, 1997). What they suggest is that conflict does not simply emerge 
from group difference, but rather, it emerges from the absence of properly functioning 
institutions. In political terms, instrumentalists would promote forms of governance such as 
federalism, consociational democracy, and other institutional arrangements to restructure 
domestic conflict in much the same way that idealists promote international organizations, 
transnational organizations, transnational regimes, and liberal democracy as facilitators for 
peace for the global system. Although these two perspectives may seem to oppose one another, 
they are in fact not mutually exclusive, they may only represent “tendencies towards either 
acceptance or denial of the peaceful prospect of intercultural interaction” (Henderson, 1997).  
 
In order to asses the instrumentalist approach, this paper will have to examine the direct and 
indirect effects of ethnic-based instrumentalism on ethnic identification and ethnic 
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mobilization. Furthermore, the focus should also be more specifically on ethnic-based access to 
economic and political resources because, as discussed above, this constitutes the driving force 
for ethnic mobilization according the instrumentalist view. In the chapters to follow this study 
will look into Sudanese state as a key factor in keeping peripheral areas such as Darfur 
classified as “closed district” which had the result of marginalizing the region and excluding 
them from the development processes of the country. Also, the government’s use of the 
Janjaweed in its counter-insurgency strategy seems to have contributed to mobilizing one 
group in opposition of another. The state, however, only constitutes one aspect of this 
grievance. Colonialism and the politics of decolonization also greatly contributed to the current 
structure and therefore deserve attention. Furthermore, environmental factors such as drought 
and desertification helped create the ideal context within which this form of mobilization might 
occur. Therefore, even though the conflict may bare strong cultural dimensions, this study will 
consider the possibility that it might constitute an essentially political and economical one. 
Where this section was primarily preoccupied with the concept of ethnicity, the next section 
will look into the different perspectives which exist regarding war and how war and ethnicity 
interact.  
 
2.2     The New War Framework 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s the types of conflicts which have made the headlines has 
drastically changed, both in terms of their composition and their conduct. One important aspect 
of these wars is that they have political goals with the political mobilization occurring on the 
basis of identity. The main strategy under this new form of warfare is population displacement 
and destabilization in an attempt to get rid of those whose identity is different and to provoke 
fear and hatred. This exclusive and identity driven form of politics also has unique economic 
roots. The various political and military actors plunder the assets of ordinary civilians and that 
of the remnants of the state while at the same time taking for themselves many of the resources 
provided by external assistance provided for the victims. These new conflicts bear a striking 
resemblance to organized violence, more than they resemble wars in the classical sense. Areas 
which have been particularly hit by this new type of organized violence are Africa, Eastern 
Europe and the Middle-East. This is also exactly what the world is currently witnessing in 
Darfur. The violent relationship between the different actors in Darfur and the means through 
which they confront one another has become subject to debate amongst scholars in terms of the 
origins of the conflict and the resemblance it bears to other conflicts since the end of the cold 
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war. By contrasting these new wars to the classical inter-state war of the mid-17th century until 
the early 20th century, various new and distinctive characteristics come to surface.  
 
The remainder of this chapter will seek to analyze these new and distinctive characteristics 
with the aim of providing a framework from which to look at the war in Darfur. Although the 
new wars have various dimension about them and may differ from case study to case study, all 
of them non the less share the same basic and determining features, features and/or 
characteristics which apply to most or all 21st century intra-state conflicts. Scholars such as 
Kaldor (2006) and Münkler (2007) refer to these conflicts as ‘new wars”. The new war 
framework provides a broader and more universal explanation for the sudden eruption of the 
war in Darfur. More so, it allows the study to compare and apply the findings to other violent 
21st century conflicts, conflicts over which the international community have little control over 
so far.   
 
Martin van Creveld (1991) developed an argument and model on the nature of warfare and 
provides a similar framework for the evaluation of these new wars (or what he terms non-
conventional warfare or low-intensity conflicts). Van Creveld proposes a “nontrinitarian 
model” for the analysis of war and argues that the Clausewitz's model of a “trinitarian 
arrangement among the people, army and government is no longer valid” in the current era.  
The argument is made that the Clausewitz's model does not hold for all types of warfare. Put 
differently, his argument is therefore that the concept of war and its conventional application is 
no longer useful in the modern age. It fails to recognize various trend and characteristics of 
modern wars (van Creveld, 1991). Van Creveld therefore questions the basic premises of inter-
state wars, which is “that war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a 
mixture of other means” (Clausewitz, 1968).    
 
Trends  in  warfare  since  1945   are  examined by van Creveld  to illustrate that  forces are  
currently at work that  are not well explained by Clausewitz's strictly political framework. The 
essential requirements for the Clausewitzian model requires a social system which recognizes 
states as the main actors involved and the central force of any conflict. Then also, the forces 
within the state that must be managed and form a “trinity of people, army, and government”. 
While still  valid  for  conventional warfare, Clausewitz's ‘trinitarian model’ does  not account 
for all types of warfare,  specifically most forms of, what van Creveld calls, ‘low intensity  
conflict’ and the unconventional war  common since 1945 (van Creveld, 1992). 
29 
 
 
Van Creveld distinguishes three principle characteristics of low-intensity conflict, all of which 
correspond to certain degree to the ‘new warfare’ argument of Mary Kaldor and certainly also 
the current conflict in Darfur. Firstly, these conflicts tend to “unfold in less developed parts of 
the world” whereas the small scale armed conflicts which do take place in the developed world 
are usually referred to as ‘terrorism’ or ‘police work’. Secondly, these conflicts rarely involve 
regular armies on both sides, though often it is conducted between regular forces on the one 
side and guerrillas, terrorists and/civilians on the other side. Thirdly, most of these low-
intensity conflicts do not rely on high-technology weaponry available to the developed world 
and to modern armed forces. The key element of low-intensity conflict is the fact that it has 
become the dominant instrument for bringing about political change (van Creveld, 1991).  
 
A brief deconstruction is necessary in order to explain the concept of new wars as it will be 
used in this study. As Kaldor argues, the term war denotes the “political nature of this new type 
of violence”. Because this paper is concerned with the political origins of conflict it excepts 
this conceptualization, yet it also recognizes the fact that one characteristic of the new wars is 
that the traditional and strict distinction between war; organized crime; and large scale 
violations of human rights has become blurred in many of the 21st century wars, with most 
conflicts usually containing various of all three of these concepts. Therefore, if one defines war 
as “violence between states or organized political groups for political motives”; organized  
crime as “violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes”; and 
violations of human rights as “violence undertaken by states or politically organized groups 
against individuals”, it becomes quite apparent that any conflict which simultaneously contains 
all these elements requires a new analytical framework in order to study the origins and 
resolution of these conflicts. The new war framework which will be employed in this study is 
ideally suited for the conflict in Darfur, seeing that this war presents clear evidence that the 
actors involved and the means through which they conduct war does not fall into the 
Clausewitzs’ or “old wars” framework for explaining violent conflicts. As illustrated by the 
information provided so far, the war in Darfur clearly contains traces of all three of the concept 
outlined above, therefore making the new war argument a suitable framework through which to 
study the conflict (Kaldor, 2006: 2).  
 
In order to further explain what exactly is meant by the new wars is will prove helpful to 
differentiate the new wars from the old wars. Kaldor (2006) argues that the new wars “form 
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part of a process which is more or less a reversal of the process through which modern states 
evolved”. Looking at the way the old wars were conducted one sees that it occurred in the 
context of politicians and rulers usually increasing taxation and national borrowing coupled 
with the recruitment of large national armies and police forces with a strong emphasis on 
national support, often via a heightened sense of nationalism. Because of this, a war could only 
be conducted via the state level and in turn, required a strong state in order to be able to 
conduct war. Kaldor says that “the growing destructiveness of war against other states was 
paralleled by a process of growing security at home” (Kaldor, 2006: 7). The new wars, on the 
other hand, should rather be seen in the reverse where instead of higher state income via 
taxation and lending, state income decreases as a result of a weak economy and poor financial 
policies and only gets worst with time as a result of high corruption, criminality, and 
inefficiency. As will be illustrated in the section to follow, the new wars occur instead in the 
context of the erosion of the autonomy of the state, or simply, the weak state.  
 
2.3     Characteristics of the New Wars 
 
2.3.1     Identity Politics 
 
According to Kaldor (2006: 72), “the political goals of the new wars are about the claim to 
power based on seemingly traditional identities [such as] nation, tribe, or religion”.  This claim 
by Kaldor therefore addresses the research question of this paper ethnic conflict. Kaldor does 
not except the notion that these politics of particularistic identities arise out of a primordial or 
traditionalist context. Rather, politics of identity should more often be seen as a result of 
individuals, groups or politician reacting to the effects marginalization, underdevelopment or 
loss of state power and legitimacy with identity politics merely being an easy means of 
mobilizing people behind a greater sentiment arising from these conditions. A strong sense of 
inequality, poverty, landlessness, and lack of adequate government services may drive 
individuals and groups to a state of extreme dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction usually occurs 
in relative terms, meaning that when one group (or region, as is the case in Darfur) suffers from 
chronic underdevelopment while another region within the same national border obtains a 
disproportionate share of government support, the effect may turn to violent opposition. 
Furthermore, if these differences in access to resources and services form along historical 
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ethnic lines (however ill-defined these lines may be) the likelihood that dissatisfaction will be 
raised (or mobilized) in ethnic, religious, or racial term increases.  
 
Identity politics in this context can be defined as “movements which mobilize around ethnic, 
racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power” (Kaldor, 2006: 80). In order 
to illustrate the nature of identity politics unique to the new wars it proves helpful to apply 
Kaldor’s (2006: 7) contrast between the politics of identity and the politics of ideas. When 
looking at nationalist movement in Europe in the 17th century one sees a particular type of 
nationalism, concerned primarily with the freeing of individuals from the over-dominant rule 
of the Catholic Church. Again, in the 19th century Europe or in colonial Africa the type of 
nationalism which played out was in the context of state-building and/or democracy. In both 
these historical periods nationalism was used as a way to bind people together under the idea of 
a nation for the greater purpose of modernization. The type of ideational politics which were 
employed here were therefore forward-looking projects. In a similar vein, the current surge in 
environmentalism and cosmopolitism in global political arenas, especially in the developed and 
semi-developed regions of the world, also fall in line with the forward thinking ideas for the 
future (Kaldor, 2006: 80).  
 
On the other hand, and in direct contrast to these forward looking projects, the identity politics 
being witnessed in the new wars are generally “fragmentative, backward-looking, and 
exclusive” (Kaldor, 2006: 81). What is meant by this is that the specific political grouping, like 
for example Muslim or Christian, or African and Arab, can generally be said to be based on a 
“reconstruction of a heroic past, the memory of injustices, real or imagined, and famous 
battles, won or lost” (Kaldor, 2006: 81). An important factor to consider is how this “nostalgia” 
is rekindled and mobilized into something political. The best way of achieving such a goal is 
through invoking insecurity amongst masses of people. By rekindling a sense of fear and/or 
hate for an historical enemy and by making certain people belief that they are being threatened 
by another group with a different label, one is able to add even more meaning to this 
constructed identity. This type of politics therefore greatly depends on a feared and hated sense 
of the “other” or the one labeled differently. It should therefore be clear why these types of 
political identities are backward-looking. Munkler (2007:57) says that this type of labeling 
leads to psychological discrimination and, at worst, to population expulsion and genocide.  
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The question to raise at this point is why certain groups and/or individuals resort to this kind of 
divided politics, often knowing what the consequences might be. It has already been mentioned 
that this type of identity politics occur in the context of the disintegration or the erosion of the 
autonomy of the state structures. Kaldor (2006) says that this is particularly the case when 
these states are authoritarian states or in centralized states. For example, the fall of communism 
in 1989 and the loss of popular legitimacy experienced in many post-colonial African countries 
to a large extent contributed to the climate of insecurity in which the new wars and their 
politics of identity seems to thrive. In answering the question raised above, two possible 
explanations exist where both of them might simultaneously contribute to the political division 
of groups along ethnic lines.  
 
On the one hand, this type of identity politics may be fostered from above. In this case it can be 
seen a reaction by established political classes to “the growing impotence and declining 
legitimacy” they face within the structure of the state (Kaldor, 2006:82). This type of politics 
from above can be seen as a form of political mobilization, or rather, a survival tactic for 
politicians active in national politics either at the regional or at the national level. On the other 
hand, identity politics may also emerge from the bottom up, meaning that it emerges as a result 
of insecurity associated with underdevelopment, poverty, inequality and various other 
grievance related factors. This is directly related to the rise of what many refer to as the parallel 
economy in which “new forms of legal and illegal ways of making a living spring up amongst 
the excluded sectors of society” (Münkler, 2007: 76). Exclusive identity formation from below 
serve as a means for these excluded groups to legitimize these new “shadowy forms of 
activity”.   
 
One example where these forms of identity politics have been most apparent has been the 
Former Yugoslavia where identity politics where fueled both from below and from above. 
With the collapse of Communism in 1989 the country spun into a disarray with politician 
desperately trying to maintain their grip on the weak new state form while, at the same time, 
new forms of economic (and criminal) activity emerged from the bottom as desperate people 
on the margins of society struggled to maintain their livelihood. Nationalism was the means 
through which the actors from below and from above legitimized their conduct. Nationalism 
(or rather, certain officially recognized nationalities) therefore became the primary and 
legitimate means through which actors could pursue political, economical and social 
objectives. What made this even worse was the fact that in the Former Yugoslavia these 
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‘different nationalities’ were constitutionally enshrined, therefore entrenching the animosity 
which developed between the different groups.   
 
In the African continent one is able to observe similar tendencies of identity politics as those 
witnessed in Eastern Europe. Many scholars blame the sudden surge of ethnic uprisings and 
ethnic and nationalists oppositions as the result of the “fragility of the post-colonial 
administrative structures” (Kaldor, 2006: 84). Various states such as Sudan, Nigeria, Zaire, and 
Rwanda struggle with problem such as poverty, inequality, under-development, the failure of 
development projects, rapid urbanization, and the breakup of traditional rural communities. 
Furthermore, many of these countries have also felt the pinch of structural adjustment policies 
under the International Monetary Fund and other International Organizations which include 
policies such as deregularization, market liberalization, and stabilization. Many of these 
countries were also aligned to the bi-polar world structure prior to the collapse of communism, 
siding either with the Soviet Union or NATO. When this structure broke down in 1989 many 
of these countries lost their international identity in terms of alignment. Any one or any 
combination of these factors may possibly explain why many African politicians, both those 
ruling and those aspiring for leadership, and individual groups started to play the ethnic card 
via identity politics. This was therefore done for various possible reasons including: “to justify 
authoritarian policies, to create scapegoats, and to mobilize support around fear and insecurity” 
(Kaldor, 2996:17).  
 
A typical phenomena of the weak states in which the new wars play out involves bands of 
young men which Kaldor (2006: 87) calls the new adventurers who make a living through 
violence or through threats of violence. These young men are particularly skilled in obtaining 
surplus weapons via the black market or through lootings and raids. Their strength and their 
surprising capabilities are usually dependent on certain particularistic networks, relating mostly 
to ethnicity, race or religion. They also often seek respectability through particularistic claims. 
Their business may include hostage-taking or the taking of prisoners in exchange for food, 
money or weapons. They also often take the form of nationalist militia groups consisting of 
unemployed youths, all of which “feed on the remnants of the disintegrating state and on the 
frustrations and resentments of the poor and the unemployed” (Kaldor, 2006: 17).  
 
The phenomena describes above may become particularly problematic when politicians, elites 
or intellectuals ally with these militias or “new adventurers” on the margins of society. What 
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these politicians or elites do is mobilize the excluded, the abandoned, the landless, the insecure 
or the impoverished, all for the purpose of capturing support and so sustaining power. Chapter 
4 will critically consider the government’s use of the Janjaweed against the rebel movements 
and civilians in line with this argument. The logic which can be deducted from this point so far 
is that in a state with a high degree of insecurity the chances are that the society will be 
polarized, meaning that there will most likely be less space for any other alternative integrative 
political values. This is especially the case in during war times when the alliances between 
politician and militias or gangs become much more solid as a result of shared complicity in war 
crimes and a “mutual dependence on the continued functioning of the war economy”. The 
Rwanda genocide example illustrates this point very well. When looking at the way in which 
the Hutus attempted to retain their grip on power in the face of democratization and 
international pressure de Waal & Omaar (1994: 35) notes that “the extremists aim was for the 
entire Hutu population to participate in the killings. That way, the blood of genocide would 
stain everybody. There could be no going back”.     
 
2.3.2     Privatization of Force 
 
Jeffrey Herbst (1996: 121) provides additional insight into the nature of the type of state in 
which the new wars occur when he says that many, or even most, African states never actually 
complied with the notion of the state sovereignty in the modern sense. What he means by this 
is that African states never actually exhibited “unquestioned physical control over the defined 
territory” and also that they also never had a successful “administrative presence throughout 
the country and the allegiance of the population to the idea of the state”. His argument is 
therefore very similar to that of Kaldor (2006) and Münkler (2007) in that all of them 
recognizes that the failing states in Africa and, to a certain extent in South-East Asia and 
Eastern Europe, all have as an important characteristic the “loss of control over and 
fragmentation of the instruments of physical coercion” (Herbst, 1996: 122). This loss of 
physical coercion can be seen as the start of a disintegrative cycle holding various negative 
implications for the state and its people. First of all, this loss of coercion and the “loss of 
popular allegiance” (Herbst, 1996: 122) make it extremely hard for the state to collect taxes 
and therefore seriously reduces the states available surplus and therefore its ability to maintain 
control. In this context of tax evasion various new actors emerge who take over the role of the 
state and its role of protection. This phenomena only further reduces the states capacity to 
maintain control and, according to Herbst (1996: 121) “encourages the fragmentation of 
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military units”. This is the context in which the new wars operate: the weakening of states 
followed by the privatization of violence.  
 
An important characteristic of the new wars, directly related to the above, therefore has to do 
with the way in which they are conducted, or, put differently, has to do with the mode of 
warfare. This development in terms of this new form of conduct of war may be termed the “de-
statization” or privatization of military forces. This form of privatization is perhaps best 
explained by referring to the growing prevalence of para-state and private players which have 
been featuring more and more in intra-state conflicts. The actors fighting in these wars 
therefore form part of a wide variety of fighting units which include both public and private, 
state and non-state, or a mixture of these. These actors may include regular armed forces, 
mercenaries, child soldiers, private military firms, para-military soldiers, and militias. It is also 
often the case that these actors are driven by the commercialization of military force. An 
important note to make here is that land may also be considered as a commercial item or a 
commodity, therefore land may be as an important incentive for private actors pursuing a 
military strategy. The following chapters will clearly illustrate how the struggle for land and 
the value which land holds for many Darfurians contributed to the motives of the different 
warring parties (Münkler, 2007:17).  
 
An important type of fighting unit, especially for this study, is the pare-military units. Para-
military units are basically autonomous groups of armed men who are generally centered 
around an individual leader, often a strong warlord. It is most often the case that these units are 
created and partly maintained by governments, this being a way for a government to remove 
itself from the implications of violence and the full cost of violence. A good example where 
this type of government sponsored paramilitary groups played an important role was in Bosnia 
with the Arkan’s tigers. Also, in Rwanda in 1994 the government started to recruit unemployed 
young men and help them form into an organized militia group which was linked directly to 
the ruling party at that stage. These men, although constituting a private fighting unit, where 
financed by the government and partly trained by the government army.  Also, in Kosovo there 
was a famous para-military group called Frenki’s Boys which were directly linked to the 
notorious leader Milosevic. These para-military units are most often recruited from actors 
ranging from redundant soldiers and/or young men who face unemployment and are 
desperately trying to sustain a living. One characteristic of these units is the fact that they very 
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seldom where uniforms which make it very hard for international observers to distinguish them 
from ordinary civilians (Kaldor, 2006: 103).  
 
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, it is possible to draw a direct relation between this 
form of military privatization and the states’ loss of its legitimate monopoly of military force. 
This is illustrated by the fact that when states do feature in these wars, it usually only does so 
with the assistance of para-state units of bands of armed gangs often only in the conflict with 
the aim of financial or commercial gain. Economic motivations therefore feature strongly in 
the considerations of these para-military units. Usually these commercial incentives come in 
the form of the belonging s from the houses of those that they drove out and murdered, or 
simply taking over the land and its livestock. This form of violence has also become much 
easier largely because of the fact that the conduct of war has become much less expensive with 
light weapons being easily available at low prices without requiring any extensive training for 
their use. Furthermore, these warlords and local militias are usually not equipped to conduct 
warfare and because the states within which they operate are faced with limited surplus and 
funding, they usually have to find ways of financing their war efforts on their own. Therefore, 
the use of violence against civilians often becomes their only resort and means through which 
to support their conduct (Münkler, 2007: 17).  
 
Another way in which these paramilitary units support themselves is through the “shadow 
globalization” phenomena. Many scholars refer to this phenomena when they note how many 
conflict regions are linked to the world economy and are so more able to draw from it the 
resources necessary for the continuation of the conflict. In its strict sense, “shadow 
globalization” refers to, for example, “émigré communities that support either or both warring 
parties by means of money transfers, business transactions, the recruitment of volunteers 
and/or the reception of wounded or exhausted soldiers” (Münkler, 2007:10). It is possible to 
argue that the strong presence of refugee camps in neighboring countries to Sudan, usually 
under UN protection, plays a large role in fulfilling the same role as the shadow globalization 
phenomena. In this context, the refugee camp should not only be seen as a humanitarian 
station, but also as a possible supply center and reserve force where humanitarian aid from 
foreign countries and international organizations is to some extent converted into resources for 
the continuation of the war. As is obvious, this only serves in prolong the conflict.  
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In this context, violence becomes privatized largely because of “growing organized crime and 
the emergence of para-military groups”, this in the face of politician and elite loosing their grip 
on control and legitimate power, unable to raise armies and police forces strong enough to 
maintain a monopoly on violence within the country. One of the most important, and often 
over-looked, characteristics of the strong modern state is its ability to “separate the use of force 
from commercial activity” and its ability to establish this separation into a norm. This 
achievement is solely possible because of the states’ (using the Webberian definition) de facto 
monopoly on war. This contrast to the old forms of state power and aggression presents a grim 
image of the weak 21st century state. Possibly the worst effect of this form of conflict is the fact 
that it becomes harder and harder to distinguish between, for example, the rebel and the 
legitimate bearer of arms and the non-combatant, or between a soldier and a criminal.  
 
2.3.3     Patterns of Violence 
 
The new wars typically lack that which was characteristic of the inter-state wars from the mid-
17th to the early 20th century: “[a] decisive battle” which, in the Clausewitz sense, was the 
“real center of gravity of the war” (Clausewitz, 1968). These old wars were relatively short 
with both sides usually seeking to resolve their dispute through a decisive battle that would 
ideally lead to a subsequent peace settlement. Furthermore, war was both declared and 
conducted in accordance both certain rules and norms. Münkler (2007: 10) says that these wars 
“had a precise definition in time, beginning with the declaration of war and ending with the 
peace settlement”. The new wars, on the other hand and the actors involved in them adopt a 
type of strategy called “strategic defensive” in which they use military force primarily as a 
means of “self preservation”, without looking for a military way of resolving the war 
(Münkler, 2007: 30). The logic which follows from this is that when both sides of the conflict 
conduct employ this strategy, coupled with enough internal and/or external funding and 
support, the war can theoretically last forever.  
 
Another development and key characteristic of the new wars, related to the above, has to do 
with the alignment of military forces. Münkler, (2007:3) argues that “[there is] a greater 
asymmetry of military force, so that the adversaries are as a rule not evenly matched”. What 
this means is that there no longer exist strict war fronts (in the classical sense) with two parties 
or groups trying to ware one another out on a battlefield. Physical and direct conflict between 
adversaries is usually at a minimum and major battles, such as those which were characteristic 
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of the First and Second World War, no longer exist. Instead, as pointed out earlier, apposing 
forces often spare one another and turn their violence and/or aggression against civilians. An 
important implication of this form of asymmetrical warfare is that it endorses a certain type of 
conduct which would normally have been considered a “subordinate military strategy” 
(Münkler, 2007: 30). This type of conflict bares a striking resemblance to guerilla warfare. 
Revolutionary warfare as it was practiced by leaders such as Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara 
also used these guerilla tactics with the aim of finding a way around “large-scale 
concentrations of conventional forces and that were almost counter to conventional strategic 
theory”. One of the basic objectives of this type of strategy is the control of territory through 
gaining support of the local population rather than through capturing territory from enemy 
forces. A territory is also controlled via political mans as opposed to actually capturing 
territory from enemy forces. The implications which this strategy holds for civilians is 
therefore extremely grave.  
 
Another strategy called counter-insurgency also plays a determining role in the new wars. This 
type of strategy was designed in order to counter the guerilla type of warfare mentioned above. 
Counter-insurgency is commonly used via conventional military forces. The strategy here has 
been the destruction of the environment in which the rebels operate. This strategy basically 
“poisons the sea for the fish” (Kaldor, 2006: 103). The most common techniques used under 
this strategy include forcible resettlement or area destruction. The main idea under this strategy 
is to get rid of all possible opponents. Basically, the new warfare seeks to create an unfavorable 
environment for all those people that it cannot control. Normally one would seek to establish 
an alliance with people or groups on one’s own side via the distribution of benefits. In the new 
war context, however, there are very little to offer to one’s followers as a result of poverty 
and/or under-development. The strategy of these counter-insurgency forces therefore depends 
to a large extend on the mobilization of fear and insecurity and also the evoking a sense of fear 
and hatred towards those which are labeled as “different”. It becomes apparent therefore why 
the use of population displacement is so readily employed and the importance which the actors 
involved attach to involving as many people as possible in these crimes so as to ensure a sense 
of shared complicity.  
 
It is important to note what is meant under population displacement seeing that it forms an 
important aspect of the new wars and the devastating effect which it has on ordinary civilians. 
Firstly it may involve the systematic murder of anyone who is labeled differently. This was 
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exactly what happened during the Rwanda genocide with the Tutsi population being killed on a 
systematic basis. Secondly, it may involve ethnic cleansing or forcible population expulsion 
and thirdly, it may involve the rendering of an area as uninhabitable. This last strategy is 
perhaps the most commonly used and may involve acts such as the use of land mines or 
through the use of bombs and missiles aimed at civilian targets such as homes and hospitals. It 
may also be done via economic means such as forced famines and by depriving people of their 
livelihood. The chapters to follow will illustrate how this was achieved in Darfur and how 
people where literally forced to die of hunger or forced to migrate.  
 
An important factor to consider is that all of these techniques fall within the definition of 
genocide contained in the 1948 Geneva Convention. The quite below from article 2 prove this 
claim: “In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole o in part, a national, racial, or religious group as such: a) Killing 
members of the group; b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) 
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; d) Imposing measure intended to prevent births within the 
group; e) Forcibly transferring the children of the group to another group” (Horowits). Base on 
the information provided so far it seems clear that most of the techniques employed by the new 
wars implicate them into what is generally understood to be genocide.  
 
The new wars therefore endorse a kind of conduct which in the old war framework would have 
been considered as illegitimate and totally undesirable. This statement can be supported by 
looking at the statistics published in the last few years. As mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter, more than 85 percent of the casualties of war in the old wars were official military 
forces whereas more than 80 percent of the casualties in the new wars from the 1990s onwards 
where civilians (Smith, 1997: 1). The effect of population displacement can also be proved by 
looking at the statistics available on refugees and displaced persons. Statistics published by 
UNHCR place the total amount of refugees in 1975 at 2.4 million. The number of refugees in 
1985 where 10.5 million. This figure rose even further when in 1995 it stood at 14.4 million. 
These figures where also used by Mary Kaldor (2006) in her development of the new war 
framework. The figure above apply only to global refugees crossing international borders and 
doesn’t include figures for internally displaced persons. If one look at the figures for internally 
displaced persons one sees that it increased from 22 million in 1980 to 38 million in 1995 and 
declining again to 32 million in 2004 (US Committee on Refugees).  
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2.3.4     Victims of the new wars 
 
The obvious explanation for these statistics lie in the fact that there has been a drastic decline 
in the number of inter-state war and a drastic increase in the number in intra-state conflicts. 
This explanation, however, is still not sufficient enough and instead, this study takes a step 
further by noting that within the new war framework force and aggression is primarily directed 
not by opposing armed forces against one another, but instead, is directed mainly against the 
civilian population with the aim of driving them from certain areas, often thorough a strategy 
similar to ethnic cleansing or population expulsion, or to force these people to supply and 
harbor certain armed groups on a regular basis. Münkler (2007:14) notes how, in the latter 
example, “the boundaries between working life and the use of force becomes blurred”. War, 
therefore becomes a way of life and the actors involved in the war makes a living from the war, 
some even obtain a considerable amount of wealth through the war, especially if natural 
resources are involved. This explains why many of the fighting units have a vested interest in 
continuation of the war. Furthermore, the way to achieving this interest is no longer the 
classical large battle, but instead, the massacre (Sofsky, 2003: 162).  
 
What the information provided so far brings into question for the study is whether it makes 
sense to adopt a concept of war knowing that the concept can no longer account for all of the 
so far mentioned developments and their implications. As states loose their grip on the their 
monopoly of legitimate violence, so to does the concept of war looses it “well-defined 
contours”, with the result being that military force and organized crime become almost 
indistinguishable from one another. It therefore becomes harder and harder for analysts to 
differentiate between criminal actors with political claims and regular armies, or armed 
followers of actors such as warlords, that finance and support their illegal operations through 
theft, plunder and trade in illegal goods. It becomes quite apparent therefore that the concept of 
war should be brought into reconsideration and re-evaluation.   
 
This study raises the problem that unless more attention is given to these new patterns of 
violence and crime at the sub-state level, and, if analyst continue to apply the traditional model 
of inter-state war logic, they stands the risk of ignoring a very important and highly destructive 
part of 21st century political reality (Münkler, 2007). The study will therefore apply this new 
war framework in its analysis of the conflict in Darfur and will seek to determine the causes of 
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the conflict via this framework. Also, this framework will greatly assist the study in 
determining whether the conflict has ancient ethnic root causes or whether it has contemporary 
political causes. The new war argument clearly states that ethnic conflicts are indeed a modern 
phenomena and should be seen in the context of modernization. The remainder of the paper 
will consider this statement and attempt to establish whether this is in fact the case in the 
current conflict in Darfur.  
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Chapter 3                Overview of Darfur and the Conflict 
 
3.1     Identity in Darfur 
 
3.1.1     Ethnic Demographics  
 
In order to commence a discourse on identity in Darfur, it is important to briefly mention 
something about the ecological and demographic nature of Darfur because identity in Darfur 
has often been discussed in direct relation to the ecological zone which different people choose 
to reside in. It is often the case that the home land which people choose depends greatly on 
which ecological zone is considered most suited to that groups’ economic activity. The region 
of Darfur can be divided into more or less three important ecological zones, each of which 
harbors specific groups involved in specific types of economic activity (Fadul, 1006: 33). In 
the North of the region one finds the desert areas where rainfall is typically at a minimum and 
grazing zones limited during the dry seasons. This area typically attracts the people involved in 
pastoralist activity (usually cattle and camel herding). The second important zone is the south 
which typically consists of savanna terrain which enjoys much more rainfall than the arid 
northern parts. This area is also typically occupied by pastoralists involved in cattle and camel 
herding. The third zone lies in the central areas where the soil is much richer because of plenty-
full rainfall. This area is perfectly suited for agricultural activity and is therefore generally 
occupied by sedentary farmers and cultivators. Mohamed & Badri (1994) estimate that more or 
less 15 percent of the regions inhabitance are pastoral nomads, whereas 75 percent of the 
people are sedentary farmers.    
 
Having now mentioned the different ecological divisions within Darfur it is also important to 
note how each of these ecological zones are said to harbor specific ethnic group. The ethnic 
groups which have commonly been described “African” or “non-Arab” include tribes such as 
the Tama, the Fur, the Daju, the Masalit, and the Senyar. Theses tribes are said to generally 
share a common characteristic (unrelated to their actual skin color or their religion) which is 
the fact that they all reside in the central areas of Darfur and practice a sedentary or agricultural 
form of living.  The tribes which have commonly been described as “Arab” include the 
Reizegat, the Beni, the Ta’aisha, the Beni Helba, and the Habbaniya. Like the “African” tribes, 
the “Arab” tribes also said to share as common demographic characteristic which is that they 
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are involved in nomadic pastoralist lifestyles and that most of them live in the dry southern and 
northern areas of Darfur. It is certainly possible to argue that in Darfur ethnic groups tent to 
identify with either one of the two traditional subsistence patterns, yet it is not so certain 
whether this livelihood can be directly correlated with a primordial identity (Haaland, 1972: 
11).  
 
So far the section has outlined the main division among these various groups (or tribes) noting 
that this division seems to relate to their lifestyle, or rather, their livelihood, as opposed to their 
race (Kajee, 2006: 75). These divisions between sedentary African and nomadic or pastoralist 
Arabs may prove helpful for those seeking to comprehend the conflict in Darfur in a simplistic 
manner.  The reality, however, is that these groups and the divisions amongst them a far less 
linier than the picture sketched above. The “looseness” of this division becomes apparent when 
one looks at the centuries of intermarriage between these groups, the frequency of (up until 
quite recent) cultural assimilation, and the often willful changes from one mode of economic 
subsistence to the other with the end result being that the notion of “Arab” and “African” 
remains exactly that: notional- something which perhaps has its roots in a contemporary 
context (Kajee, 2006: 75), (Cook, 2006: 123). The section below will attempt to shed further 
light on this statement.  
 
3.1.2     Mixed identities  
 
It is possible to make a strong argument that the strict ethnic differences which we see today in 
Darfur, namely those between sedentary “African” farmers and semi-nomadic “Arab” 
pastoralists, have not existed for centuries and can, instead, be viewed as a contemporary 
phenomena, something which was ideologically constructed, as de Waal (2005: 181) would 
argue. By looking at the way in which, up until quite recently, it was quite common for 
members of the Fur tribe to purchase and herd cattle and in the same process to “become 
Bagara” and to adopt the livelihood commonly associated with cattle-herding Arabs, one sees 
that identities are not as fixed as commonly assumed. Furthermore, even though most analysts 
regard the Fur people as the original or the first indigenous inhabitance of the region, the 
reality is that the Fur people themselves are the result of migration and assimilation starting 
from the fourteenth century. In the pre-colonial times it was very common for weaker tribes to 
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assimilate and “become Fur” as a result of both conquest and religious and linguistic 
acculturization (Kajee, 2006: 76).  
 
One of the common arguments made regarding the conflict has been that the war has strong 
racial characteristics involving ‘Arabs’ who are trying to eliminate ‘Africans’. This claim can 
also be questioned by noting how both the terms ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ have several meanings 
in Sudan. Turton (1997: 90) notes how there have been documented at least three meanings of 
Arab. Locally, the term Arab can be seen as a pejorative reference to the lifestyle of the nomad 
as uncivilized; regionally, the term refers to someone whose primary language was Arabic. In 
this sense, a group could become Arab over time. This process, known as Arabisation, was not 
an anomaly in the region in that there has been similarities in other regions as well, such as 
Amharisation in Ethiopia and Swahilisation on the East African coast. The third meaning of 
Arab was “privileged and exclusive”, belonging the riverine political aristocracy who had ruled 
Sudan since independence, and who “equated Arabisation with the spread of civilisation and 
being Arab with descent” Turton, 1997: 90). 
 
Some scholars such as de Waal (2005: 181) have pointed to the fact that almost up until 1989 
the distinction between “African” and “Arab” was almost entirely unused by local population 
and that people placed very little emphasis between differences between the two “races”. 
Furthermore, de Waal (2005) also notes how it was in fact very common for one group to 
consciously decide to move to another group, usually for commercial reasons, and so, to 
literally change his “ethnicity”. This was the case in some of the Gimir tribes who have been 
active over the last two centuries in assimilating into the Arab communities and in the process 
becoming more Arab and revealing more Arab characteristics than African. Another example 
of assimilation was through the process of Arabisation where people not belonging to the Arab 
communities where steadily being “Arabized through a process implemented by successive 
governments” (Deng, 1995: 66). Various of the northern Arab communities enjoy a 
disproportional affluence, providing an incentive for non-Arab groups to assimilate. These 
groups then basically adopt Islam as their religion and Arabic as their language and in the 
process raise their social standing and recognition (Deng, 1995: 66).     
 
Another example, related to the above, involves groups from one side of the divide moving to 
groups on the other side of the divide based on an evaluation of ones present circumstances. If, 
for example, an individual perceives it commercially viable, he might switch his livelihood 
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from a sedentary to a pastoralist form of living. This has often been the case for members of 
the Fur or Tunjur tribes who, depending on their economic circumstances, would often “change 
their identity” and in the same process “become Arab” (Flint & de Waal, 2005: 4). Another 
area where commercial considerations play a role is in the various market places in Darfur 
where merchants would learn as many dialects in order to switch from one identity to the other, 
depending on the client. Lastly, it is also fairly common for people in Darfur to practice both 
economic activities associated with both the Arab nomads and the African farmers. It is a very 
common sight to see farmers in the central areas of the region to keep livestock such as cattle 
and camels as it is also common for nomads to cultivate a small piece of land (de Waal, 2005: 
52). On top of this, it is also quite common for Darfurians to completely change their economic 
activity to another, and in doing so, change tribes. From the information provided so far it is 
therefore clear that when looking at identity formation, political and economic considerations 
often seem to play an important role, together with cultural considerations.  
 
A recent report by the UN Commission (2005) focused on similar factors in arguing that the 
Arab and African identities are not as fixed as the general media makes it out to be and that 
identity in Darfur should rather be seen in political terms. The report found that many Arabs in 
Darfur are actually opposed to the Janjaweed and that some Arabs are in fact fighting with the 
rebels including tribes such as the Misseriya and Rizeigat. Also, many non-Arab groups are 
supporting the government of Sudan by serving in its national army. The UN commission also 
supports the idea that political factors play a much larger role than cultural or primordial 
considerations in the African and Arab divide. It advances this view by noting how “Arab” and 
“African” have become political identities as opposed to cultural identities and says that “those 
tribes in Darfur who support rebels have increasingly come to be identified as ‘African’ and 
those supporting the government as ‘Arab’” (UN, 2005). A very good example which 
illustrates this point is the Gimmer tribe which are a pro-government African tribe that is seen 
by the other African tribes opposed to the government as having been Arabized.   
 
Barth (1994:12) make an appropriate claim when he asserts that “processes of boundary 
maintenance quickly showed interactional, historical, economical and political: they are highly 
situational, not primordial”. The quite above by Barth is unique in that it strongly favors the 
argument that identity and identity formation in Darfur is not based on primordial sentiments 
alone, but should instead be considered in the light of more recent events. The process of 
identity formation of Darfurians along the strict divide of Africans and Arabs should therefore 
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be seen as the “culmination of a sequence of factors, of political, economic, ecological, and 
sociological nature which, as a result, ended up pitting one community against another” (du 
Toit, 2006: 114). The remainder of this chapter will look at various other historical factors 
which have had an influence on the conflict in Darfur and how these factors may have shaped 
identity formation in the region.   
 
3.2     Structural Origins of the Conflict  
 
In order to understand the current conflict in Darfur it is vital to also understand the origins of 
the conflict. It is possible to date the origins of the conflict as far back as the 17th century. 
During this period, dating from the 17th century up to the current war in Darfur, various factors 
have acted as crucial elements in the evolution of the current crisis. By looking at factors such 
as the evolution of trade routes, tribal territories, systems of administrations, land rights, and 
relations between Darfur and the central government of Sudan, starting with the period of the 
Fur Sultanate to the present day, one is able to identify various national and local processes that 
have contributed to the current status quo. Some of these which will be discussed below 
include the origins of economic and political marginalization of Darfur by the central 
government, starting in the 19th century. Also, one may look within the regional context and 
note how various regional conflicts surrounding Darfur has contributed to the development of 
ethnic armed militias, and also contributed to the increase of available number of arms. Some 
of these conflicts include the north-south conflict in Sudan, the conflicts within Chad, and the 
conflicts between Chad and Libya. Lastly, one may also look at the tactic way in which ethnic 
identities have historically been manipulated in Darfur by the government and political parties, 
including the mobilization of armed militias and political mobilization based on religious and 
ethnic identity (such as Mahdism and later also Islamization and Arabism) (Feinstein 
International Famine Center, 2005: 13).  
 
One may also note how various historical process have effected the local dimension in Darfur. 
The marginalization and neglect of Darfur (which will be illustrated during this chapter and the 
next) has especially contributed to the current conflict in various ways, some of which include: 
failing institutions including the native Administration, and the judicial systems and policing 
which seems to have historically favored certain groups. Also, failing development projects, 
including the education system, health care, transport and veterinary and other services, which 
have effected different ethnic groups to varying degrees. The origins of the economic and 
47 
 
political marginalization of Darfur can be traced back to the 19th century. Before this period, 
the Kingdom of Darfur was at least as powerful and important as its neighbors. The section 
below will illustrate how the Turkish empire strengthened the central Nile riverain groups at 
the expense of the peripheral regions. This pattern was then continued during the condominium 
rule, and throughout the post-independence. These local factors may be combined with various 
other processes such as competition for, and pressure on, natural resources within Darfur due 
to a long history of drought and famine (Feinstein International Famine Center, 2005: 26).  
 
All of these processes, in one way or another, may have contributed to the current dimension of 
the conflict in Darfur. This section will discuss some of these processes only in an historical 
context, whereas the next chapter will critically examine all the contemporary manifestations 
of these processes. By briefly summarizing the history of Darfur the study will be able to 
better, and more systematically, determine which factors contributed to the current conflict in 
Darfur. The study is delimited by focusing only on certain key historical staged starting with 
the Fur Sultanate, followed by the Turco-Egyptian rule, the Mahadiya, Anglo-Egyptian 
condominium rule and the post-independence rule. The Fur Sultanate laid the foundations for 
the current patterns of tribal territories, systems of administration, land rights and trade 
networks, which all evolved further under subsequent administrations (Feinstein International 
Famine Center, 2005: 26), (O’Fahey, 2006: 23).  
 
3.3     History of Darfur 
 
3.3.1     The Fur Sultanate 
 
The Fur Sultanate was established in 1650. Before this period the history of the Kingdom 
remains very unclear and illusive. The Sultanate moved into the central area of modern day 
Darfur. These areas were the riches and also the most sought after in terms of soil quality and 
the availability of water. The Sultanate expanded its size and influence through means of 
incorporation (incorporation via voluntary and violent non-voluntary means). Over the years 
the Fur Sultanate expanded its boundaries to areas as far as to the Nile River in the East. This 
extensive conquering had as a result the expansion of trade and commerce during the 18th 
century. With its strategic proximity to the White Nile and West Africa, the region was able to 
attract many immigrants which, in turn, were encouraged by the Sultanate in that the 
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immigrants ensured a sufficient supply of manpower. These immigrants mostly included 
scholars, holy men and merchants as well as some poorer worker class immigrants. These 
immigrants were also granted land and administrational positions by the Sultanate as part of 
the Sultanate’s attempt to get people to settle. Thus, a process of cultural assimilation was set 
in motion via the incorporation of different groups from different territories (O’Fahey, 2006: 
27).  
 
During this period, tribes were generally distributed throughout the region on the basis of 
ecology and livelihood, as apposed to race or religion. Camel-based nomadism was generally 
practiced in the arid Northern areas whereas agriculture was generally practiced in the central 
rainland areas and cattle-based nomadism was practiced in the southern savanna areas. An 
interesting point worth noting is the fact that the current ethnic distribution of Darfur has not 
changed much from this basic outline, although there has been movements of particular groups. 
Another important factor in the expansion and internal consolidation of the Fur Sultanate was 
trade. Various important and lucrative trade routes were developed and many Arab traveling 
merchants (Jallaba) first came to Darfur because of these important trade routes. These trans-
Saharan and regional trade routes were well connected with local trade networks and these 
networks had a profound political, economic and cultural impact on the Sultanate and its 
development as a state. Since that time, trade has been an integral part of the people in Darfur 
and their livelihood.  Local trade, especially after the annexation period of 1916, provided an 
important forum through which the different ethnic groups interacted (O’Fahey, 2006: 27).  
 
Under the Fur Sultanate a specific type of administration system came into existence referred 
to by many as the “three tier system” ((Prunier, 2006: 36). What this entailed was that people 
were ruled largely through their own chiefs. This system was based upon four provinces, each 
divided into a number of district chiefdoms (or shartaya, ruled by shartay). These shartay were 
the Sultan’s representatives and was primarily responsible for taxation and general 
administration. The shartayas was further divided into various local chiefdoms (called 
dimlijiyya). The third layer of the system was the village sheikh. These were responsible for 
the direct administration of land, the settlement of small disputes, and tax collection (Feinstein 
International Famine Center, 2005: 14).  
 
49 
 
3.3.2     The Turco-Egyptian rule (1874-1883) 
 
The Sultanate maintained its independence until it was overthrown in 1874 by the Ottoman 
empire, which had invaded and occupied the northern part of Sudan as early as 1821. This 
period of occupation was marked by a series of revolts by the Fur and also by the Baggara 
(cattle-herding) tribesmen in the South of the region. Under the Ottoman rule both Arab and 
European traders exploited the lucrative slave trade with southern Sudan, often with the 
support of the Turco-Egyptian officials. The Baggara were part of this commercial enterprise, 
moving south to trade slaves with the small scale traveling merchants. This was the beginning 
of the north-south divide in  
Sudan. The Southerners became heavily exploited for commercial gains by Europeans and 
northern Sudanese merchants. This shift also reduced the significance of Darfur trade links, 
making it the beginning of it’s marginalization by the center (Feinstein International Famine 
Center, 2005: 15).  
 
3.3.3     The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899-1955) 
 
There exists a wide range of economic, political and environmental factors and explanations 
during this period which have led to the high levels of structural inequality between the center 
in Khartoum and the periphery (areas such as Darfur). These inequalities have fueled the 
conflict in Darfur in various and important ways. In 1898, an Anglo-Egyptian army re-
conquered Khartoum from the Ottoman Empire, yet perhaps a greater historical point was 1916 
when the British officially annexed the region to Sudan. As with many other countries under 
the British colonial rule, economic development in Sudan was geared towards serving the 
interests of the colonial economy. Production of cotton was one of the main interests of British 
rule, in order to supply the flourishing textile industry in Great Britain (Prunier, 2006: 57). This 
reinforced the routes previously established between Darfur and the Nile region in Sudan under 
the Fur Sultanate. This primary focus on cotton trade did very little to improve the conditions 
of the millions of small-scale farmers outside the scheme. Furthermore, it also meant that all 
development efforts were purely concentrated in an area which is known as the “three k’s”- 
Kosti, Kassala and Khartoum. This area covered the Nile Valley to the north of Khartoum, the 
Blue Nile and White Nile areas, central Kordofan and the southern parts of the Kassala 
province. These areas, in turn, also benefited most from the spread of education and health 
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services (O’Fahey, 2006: 28). Today, these areas remain the most wealthiest and influential 
and continue to assert their authority over the peripheral areas.  
 
Darfur’s late inclusion into the British-Sudan, combined with its geographical remoteness from 
the center in Khartoum and other trading zones, together with the condominium government’s 
unwillingness to provide services beyond “care and maintenance” (Flint and de Waal, 2005: 
13) had as a result the fact that the region remained a loosely integrated periphery with hardly 
any stakes in the political center (Rolandsen, 2007: 151). The British system of indirect rule 
offered very little room for the development of a modern economy or of an educated elite in 
Darfur and it was very rare for Darfrians to participate in the multiparty system of government 
in Khartoum. Reports reveal that by 1955, out of around 1170 schemes that had been 
implemented, none was in Darfur. In 1947, Darfur had no provincial judge, education officer 
or provincial agriculturalist (Flint and de Waal, 2005: 13).  
 
The Fur, the original inhabitants and rulers of Darfur during the Sultan period, became 
subordinate to the central government and came under rulership of the British administers and 
traders from the Nile Valley who combined skills and personal networks to become wealthy 
and influential (Ibrahim, 1984). Furthermore, minimum training or education was provided to 
the people of the region to enable them to manage their own affairs after independence. Also, 
the Arab inhabitance of Khartoum and the Blue Nile region had always received the greater 
part of British investment and when they eventually came to power, they merely continued the 
pattern of both economic and political marginalization of the rest of the country.  So began a 
system of outside economic and political dominance from Khartoum that is still in place today 
(Cook and Mironko, 2006: 130)  
 
The British rule and its administrative policy over Sudan had therefore greatly contributed to 
the marginalization of the pastoralists in Darfur. Under the tribal administration, most tribes 
were given their own homeland to be administered under local chiefs. The problem was that 
nomads were not given land because they were considered to be always on the move and 
therefore not in need of land allocation (de Waal, 2004: 6). Furthermore, the system of passage 
rights and livestock migration corridors was not very well formalized. Both nomads and semi-
nomads were in most cases dependent on grazing their cattle during the dry season in areas that 
had been reserved for the homelands of various settled farming tribes.   
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3.3.4     Post Independence 
 
Sudan became independent on 1 January 1956 and had a provisional constitution under the 
Arab-led Khartoum government. By this stage the first civil war between the North and the 
South had already been in process for more than a year (1955-1972) (Cook and Mironko, 2006: 
130).  Even prior to the independence of Sudan there had already been strong antagonism 
between the conquered elite in Darfur and the national elite in Khartoum. Some authors have 
referred to this as the “internal colonization” of Sudan (Harir, 1994: 155) and argue that it had 
begun in the last years of the condominium period and was then simply extended after 
independence. The way this “internal colonialism” functioned was basically through granting 
educated administrators from the Nile Valley the rights to take over positions which were 
previously held by the British. “The rulers, decision-makers, judges and not least, the jailors 
were riverain Sudanese whom the Darfurians generally regarded as alien to the region” (Harir, 
1994: 159). The Khartoum elites therefore exhibited an absolute form of power over the people 
over which they ruled, a type of power involving distain and exploitation.  
 
It is clear that although the policies of the British rule left Darfur in a disadvantaged position, 
they non the less left the Sudanese government in 1956 with valuable flow of income. This, 
one may argue, may have provided a good basis from which a post-independence government 
could have launched development programs to address the inherent disparities in Darfur and 
other marginalized regions, if it wanted to at least. However, instead of this, the national 
administration intensified the same processes that had been set in motion before 1956. For 
example, the expansion of irrigation pump schemes proceeded at an even higher rate after 
independence and of the 2280 schemes that had been implemented by the mid-1960s, again 
none was in Darfur. This is of course not surprising when one considers that the governments 
between 1956 and 1969 were dominated by social groups that had a natural interest in 
maintaining the economic and social framework from which they benefited. Therefore, very 
little was done to get rid of the pattern of society and economy created or maintained by 
colonial rule (Feinstein International Famine Center, 2005: 17).   
 
During the colonial period, the British authorities adopted a deliberate policy of enhancing the 
business interests of certain influential families from the central Nile Valley area, with the 
objective of minimizing resistance to their rule. This was done through preferential allocation 
of productive assets (mostly land), business contacts and bank loans (usually converted into 
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grants). The groups which benefited from this arrangement include religious leaders, tribal 
leaders and merchants. The reason why these groups came to be the main beneficiaries is 
largely due to the historical domination of religious life in northern society by Muslim Sufi 
religious orders and to the colonial state’s policy of indirect rule. Authority and political 
influence therefore rested in the hands of these social groupings. This, in turn, aggravated 
disparities in development that already existed within the Northern part of Sudan (Feinstein 
International Famine Center, 2005: 17).  
 
The colonial administration also implemented an educational policy with a probable view to 
strengthening the social groupings whose support it required. Inequality in the region was 
therefore evident in the limited availability of educational opportunities. Entry to schools were 
therefore strictly controlled and limited to the sons of tribal chiefs and wealthy merchants. The 
following quote by a British governor at that time illustrates this point: “we have been able to 
limit education to the sons of chiefs and native administration personal and can confidently 
look forward to keeping the ruling classes at the top of the education tree for many years to 
come”. After independence, religious leaders and merchants came to hold great influence in 
political, social, and economic life throughout Sudan. They dominated the first parliament and 
senate, the legislative body and the central council. It was only in the late 1960s when the 
Darfuri people started to obtain a higher education and where an intellectual elite started to 
emerge. It was also during this period when the first resistance networks started to develop in 
opposition to the dominance of the riverain Sudanese (Feinstein International Famine Center, 
2005: 18).  
 
3.3.5     The demise of Native Administration  
 
As mentioned before, the British authorities abolished the Fur Sultanate, yet it retained many 
of its institutions under its native administration policy. This form of indirect rule was designed 
to leave populations free to manage their own affairs through their own rulers, subject to 
British guidance. Basically, this model incorporated traditional tribal and village leaders into 
the structure of government. The role which the native administration played included: the 
management of tribal and local community affairs, maintaining security, allocate land for 
agriculture and grazing (under the hakura system), settle conflicts over land tenure, collect 
taxes and other levies, and chair tribal/sub-tribal local courts (judiyya). Traditional tribal 
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leaders therefore had executive, financial, and legislative powers and constituted an integral 
part of the system (Mohamed, 2006: 69).  
 
This system was more problematic than it seemed, however, and became a seriously 
contentious issue over time. One argument was that this form of administration created an 
unproductive relationship between the educated Sudanese and the tribal leaders. The main 
tension between these two factions involved the Sudanese elite claiming that the tribal leaders 
resembled “tools of the colonial regime”. The tribal leaders, on the other hand, viewed the 
educated elite as a potential threat that might undermine their own power and prestige. In 1971 
the Local Government Act was passed, which divided Darfur into regional, district and area 
councils. This system of local administration therefore replaced the Native Administration and 
in the same process abolished the jurisdiction and administrative authority of the tribal leaders. 
A system of “multiple administrative units” was created under a single political party, the 
Sudanese Socialist Union under the rule of Jafar al Numayri , and basically “created a 
bureaucracy controlled by insensitive officials from the Nile”. This naturally sparked serious 
anger on the part of the traditional authorities. Various scholars and local Darfuri’s insist that 
this change was the most important factor in triggering the conflicts on a wider scale in Darfur 
in that it meant that “a locality belonging to one tribe could now be controlled by another” 
(Mohamed, 2006: 71).  
 
This shift in administration can be seen as a modernizing act and falls in line with the 
contemporary idea of state structuring. For this study, the main problem with this shift lies in 
fact that the tribal leaders continued to be acknowledged as heads of their group, and the tribe 
now became a political base that aimed to promote its members to senior positions in local 
councils, as well as to regional and national positions. There came to be greater polarization 
along ethnic lines throughout government as representatives worked for the interests of their 
own tribe. This process has been described as “vertical ethical expansion” and has implications 
not only at the local level, but also at the regional and national level. The biggest problem with 
this was that the old order (dating back to the Fur Sultanate) was replaced by a new order 
which did not function. This process had various implication of which the most important were 
the increase of conflicts over land (including tribal territories and access for other groups) and 
conflicts over local governance, or local power struggles. The biggest problem was that these 
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problems were now increasingly being expressed and addressed in ethnic terms (Mohamed, 
2006: 73).  
 
As the section above illustrate, Darfur's wars may have roots that can be traced to the colonial 
past. This does not, however, mean that they are necessarily caused by colonization.  In fact, 
the transition from militarized forms of politics into war, typical of so many countries in Africa 
since the end of the Cold War, seems to rather be due to contemporary crises, including the 
“implosion of some states”, “short-sighted political leadership”, the consequences of “hasty 
and ill-conceived programs of structural adjustment and privatization, and sometimes enforced 
democratization”.  These have led political elites to seek new forms of political mobilization in 
which violence figures less as a means of combating the enemy than as a way of mobilizing 
support.  Economic decline and aspirations to social advancement in a situation where political 
groups are growing desperate in the context of a weak and limited state may contribute to a 
situation where people feel they can justify hatred between rival groups, often defined on 
ethnic lines, or what Mohamed (2006: 76) calls a “pseudo-traditional fundamentalism”.  
 
3.4     Drought and desertification  
 
Another important dimension of the conflict in Darfur goes back to the mid 1980s when a 
series of prolonged drought periods and encroaching desertification started to place pressure on 
water and grazing resources. Although Darfur has been hit by droughts overt various periods of 
time in history, the years 1984 and 1985 proved to be hardest yet in terms of the implications 
which it held for the region as a whole (Sulliman, 1993). This drought and desertification 
forced nomadic herder to steer their cattle and camel closer and closer to the fields of the 
sedentary farmers and in the same process placed greater pressure on the already limited 
resources available.  An important fact to note therefore is that besides the famine which 
became much more severe as a result of the drought periods, competition for resources also 
became more fierce during this period. According to de Waal (2005:112), it is possible to 
establish a clear link between this struggle for scarce resources caused by the drought and the 
rising levels of conflict which followed this period. Various other scholars and institutions 
agree with this claim, including the United Nations which claim that there exist strong 
evidence that “the hardship caused to pastoralist societies by desertification is one of the 
underlying causes of the current war in Darfur” (UNEP, 2007: 58). At the same time, however, 
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the United Nations also acknowledge that environmental factors such as drought and 
desertification “generally contributing factors only, not the sole cause of the tension”. The 
same UN report also acknowledges the role played by factors such as “political, religious, 
ethnic, tribal, and clan division, economic factors, land tenure deficiencies and historical 
feuds”. (UNEP, 2007: 77). 
 
3.4.1     The environment as a cause of conflict?  
  
Various scholars have attributed violent conflict to the effect of environmental factor and 
considerations. The most prominent of these is Homer-Dixon (1999: 13) who claims that 
factors such as drought, scarcity of resources and desertification may lead to violence, 
especially in a place where there is a high dependence on natural resources and/or agricultural 
activities. He therefore makes a direct link between environmental change and the incidence of 
war. Goldstone (2002: 24) also argues that a situation which is particularly conductive to 
conflict is when certain groups of a population or region move or migrate into areas already 
occupied by other groups in response to environmental pressure. In such a situation the 
likelihood of conflict increases significantly. This argument is very similar to that held by 
Homer-Dixon and also bares some resemblance to the current conflict in Darfur where certain 
groups were physically forced to migrate to areas populated by different groups in search of 
water and grazing which lead to more tension in an area already under severe pressure.  
 
It therefore seems clear that environmental factors did indeed play an important role in the 
conflict. However, it is also possible to adopt a more neo-classical stance when looking at 
environmental factors in the conflict. By this is meant that a societies’  
”capacity for adaptation can overcome these issues” and a properly functioning state should be 
able to absorb these problems and assist its people in time of drought and famine. Put 
differently, the hardship experienced in times of drought and famine and the grievance which 
might follow should be directed against the state and not necessarily against different groups 
from the same region. It is therefore not merely factors such as drought and resource scarcity 
that provoke the conflict in Darfur, but also the “shortage of methods available to the society in 
dealing with these problems”. If the people of Darfur had access to technology, equipment and 
infrastructure in general, they would surely have been able to overcome the effects of 
environmental issues.  
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A logical criticism against the environmental explanation for conflict is that it fails to explain 
what factors are more important in causing wars, factors more related to politics and the 
economy. This claim may be supported by the admittance by Homer-Dixon that environmental 
factors such as the scarcity of natural resources alone is unlikely to lead to war, it merely 
“assists in creating a scenario of social stresses within countries, helping to stimulate sub-
national insurgencies, ethnic clashes and urban unrest” (Homer-Dixon, 1999: 12). One may 
make the argument that with sufficient technology, development and funding the society of 
Darfur can have the ability and the capacity to overcome matters such as resource scarcity and 
famine. The study will therefore acknowledge the environment as a secondary role player in 
the conflict in Darfur, yet it will consider the social, political and economical factors as 
primary sources for the current conflict. The next section of this chapter will look at the 
different actors involved in the current war and how their actions can be seen partly as a 
response to some of the historical factors mention above, and partly as a response to political 
factors mentioned in the next chapter.  
 
3.5     The Actors  
 
3.5.1     The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 
 
The Sudan Liberation army was known up to 2003 as the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) and is 
one of the Darfuri rebel groups and also a member of the National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA). This group can generally be associated with the Fur and Massaleit tribes and the Wagi 
clan of the Zaghawa tribe and it was also the largest rebel group up until 2006.  Although 
recent developments have seen the SLM/A split into smaller ethnic factions, in its inception 
stage the group had a fur chairman- Abdel Wahid, and a Zaghawa chief of staff- Abdalla 
Abaker. Both Abdel Wahid and Abdalla Abaker believed that the enemy was the government, 
not the Arabs, and both these leaders claim to have enjoyed good relations with their Arab 
neighbors (Flint, 2007: 145). It is often said that the ability of the SLM/A to address the causes 
and grievance of such a diverse array of tribal groups constituted one of their greatest strengths 
and achievements. The local support for the movement was truly remarkable and it is partly 
because of this show of support that the government started to feel threatened and resorted to 
the strategy of mobilizing the Janjaweed, which will be discussed in the next section.  
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In the initial stages of its existence, most members of the rebel group wanted to fight the 
Awlad Zeid Arab Nomads with whom they had had continuous clashes since the early 1980s- 
not the government in Khartoum. It soon became clear that the government was in fact 
involved in supporting and facilitating the Arab Attacks on their villages. The breaking point 
was when Awlad Zeid Arabs killed more than seventy Zaghaw at Bir Taweel in the Kornoi 
area, one of the most important water sources for both Zaghawa and Arabs. After the clash, the 
national army deployed in the area and kept the Zaghawa away from the wells. This finally 
convinced most Zaghawa that fighting the Arabs would not resolve their problems. Influential 
Zaghawa in Libya and Khartoum also agreed there was a need to form an organized resistance 
group to confront the government (Flint, 2007: 145). This is an important fact in that it 
illustrates that the cause of the rebels were not against the Arabs, but rather, a fight on behalf of 
people who feel themselves neglected and marginalized by the central government. The rebels 
therefore does not cite “ethnic differences” as one of their motivations for the conflict, instead, 
they cite grievance- “originating from a central government policy of power concentration and 
marginalization towards Darfur” as their main motivation for taking up arms (Flint & de Waal, 
2005). This claim will be analyzed in terms of its accuracy and validity in the chapters to 
follow. 
 
The SLA also released a manifesto which was drafted in Southern Sudan in January 2003 by 
the SLA delegation from Darfur and senior SPLA officials. This manifesto, according to Flint 
(2007: 161) clearly reflected John Gerang’s (former leader of the SPLA) vision of a “New 
Sudan”. What this manifesto entails is: “a secular, decentralized state with the right of self-
determination as a basis for viable unity”, and calls for “the restructuring of power and an 
equal and equitable distribution of both power and wealth in all their dimensions”. Of great 
importance is the inclusive nature of this manifesto in that it claims that “the Arab tribes and 
groups are an integral and indivisible component of Darfur social fabric who have been equally 
marginalized and deprived of their rights to development and genuine political participation” 
(Flint & de Waal, 2005).  The more common and stated aim was to liberate non-Arabs from 
domination and to press for greater power and wealth-sharing for the impoverished region of 
Darfur (Cook, Mironko, 2006: 128). Its early political demand included socio-economic 
development in the region, wealth sharing and greater representation in the central government 
for Darfuris.  
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In the beginning of 2003 limited shipments of military supplies were provided by Eritrea and 
the SPLA, yet most of the weapons and almost all of the vehicles used by the rebels were 
seized in attacks on police and army posts in Darfur. Support in the form of arms provision and 
manpower was also provided via links with Chad and Libya and the SPLA. The Chadian 
Zaghawa who dominated Chad’s army and presidential guard supplied much of the equipment 
needed for the rebellion, and also, Zaghawa who had positions in the Libyan army or in local 
administration in Southern Libya were also very generous in their support (Feinstein, 2005). 
Furthermore, Diaspora Darfurians along with Fur and Zaghawa business communities also 
provided significant support.  
 
In 2003 there was a raid on Golo and other attacks in North Darfur in February and March 
2003. These attacks signaled a “marked escalation of the conflict” (Flint, 2007: 152). The 
watershed mark in Darfur, however, came on 25 April in al Fashir air base in a combined SLA 
and JEM attack on the air base in which five military planes and two helicopters gunships were 
destroyed on the ground and an air force general was taken captive. This marked a massive 
blow to the government of Sudan and even long afterwards generals remained uncertain of 
how to deal with this type of military strategy. The SLA’s mobile forces “ran rings around 
conventional army units that were totally unused to this style of warfare” (Flint, 2007: 152). By 
the end of that year it was estimated that the SLA had more than six to seven thousand men 
behind it whereas the JEM has about a thousand men behind it. In response to these attacks, the 
government of Sudan began its massive and indiscriminate program of arming the Popular 
Defense Forces and Janjaweed in Darfur, this will be critically discussed in the section to 
follow on the Janjaweed.     
 
In 2006 the SLA split into two factions over a dispute of whether they should sign the DPA. 
This split occurred along tribal lines, with the Fur faction (the smaller force of the two, but 
with the largest support base) led by Abdel Wahid Mohammed Nour on the one side and the 
Zeghawa faction (with a larger share of both fighters and weapons) led by Minni Manawi on 
the other side. The Minawi faction is now referred to as the SLA/MM and Minawi is the senior 
presidential assistant and head of the provincial authority in Darfur State. Various smaller units 
have also formed as the conflict has increased in intensity. It is often argued that the economic 
incentive of war has inspired the great many new rebel groups to emerge. Another problem, 
related to this factor, is the lack of control generated by the “all-consuming nature of the 
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leadership dispute” which, as Flint and de Waal argue, has led to the emergence of “rogue 
commanders answerable to none but themselves” (Flint & de Waal, 2005: 71).  
 
The SLA leaders had great difficulty in enforcing discipline in that the movement divided and 
then sub-divided. Commanders with opposing views always had the option of deserting to 
another faction, or setting up his own. This lack of cohesion among the rebel group members 
has lead to an array of other problem including the emergence of actors resembling warlords 
who begin imposing taxes on the local populations and attempting to assert their authority over 
certain areas. One example of this involves the “loose” Zaghawa forces under the leadership of 
strong, yet independent, leaders who imposed taxes of local Fur populations and who asserted 
their authority via violent means into the local Fur inhabitance (Flint, 2007: 154). Various 
other accounts exist which show the rebels also being responsible for various acts of violence. 
In the beginning of the conflict this violence was being directed mostly at government targets, 
yet as the conflict become more and more manipulated along ethnic lines, so too did the attacks 
of the rebel movements start to resemble the tactics of the Janjaweed with regular attacks 
against civilians and humanitarian organizations and their property.  
 
3.5.2     The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
 
The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) first became public in February 2003. It announced 
itself soon after the first rebel attacks on Golo and the first use of the name “Sudan Liberation 
Army”. The group, however, did not begin to organize militarily for another year. In June 
2002, delegations were sent to talk to the Masalit and Zaghawa, including Abdalla Abaker and 
Minni Minawi, and early in 2003 JEM announced a first attack on a government position near 
Kabkabiya where it managed to steal vehicles and weapons. From the start the JEM had access 
to better sources of external support than the SLA. Because many of JEM’s leaders held 
positions in government, they had access to funds and time to move them out of the country 
before beginning military operations in 2003. There also exist persistent reports that the JEM 
was supported financially by Ali all Haj, Popular Congress Party deputy to Hassan al Turabi, 
the Architect of Sudan’s Islamist revolution. Very little hard proof exists for this claim 
however. Due to its suspected links with Turabi, JEM has often been labeled as “nothing more 
than the military wing of Turabi’s Popular Congress Party in the wake of his political defeat by 
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President Bashir in 1999-2000” (Flint, 2007: 151). More of these governmental connections 
will be discussed in the next chapter on the government of Sudan.  
 
In reality, the group’s existence can be traced back to the mid-1990s when many Darfurians 
were already dissatisfied with Sudan’s Islamist leaders and certain regime insiders formed a 
secret committee from the six states of Sudan to collect information about political and 
economic marginalization. It is often claimed that the outcome of this committee resulted in the 
underground publication of the black book, though this link has never actually been 
established.  What is established is that the justice and Equality Movement based its agenda on 
this manifesto- the “black book”, published in 2000- which essentially seeks to prove the 
“disparities in the distribution of power and wealth”, by noting that Darfur and its populations, 
as well as some populations of other regions, have been “consistently marginalized and not 
included in influential positions in the central government in Khartoum” (International 
Commission of Inquiry in Darfur, 2005).  
 
This book was released in 2000 and another edition was released in 2002 and describes how 
differences in access to power since 1956 have resulted in large differentials in development. 
Its popularity and the extent of its distribution amongst the dissatisfied sections of Darfur has 
been overwhelming. English translations of the Black Book are now also available on the 
website of the JEM. One may interpret the JEM’s close affiliation with the Black Book as a 
sign that the political and economical marginalization of Darfur is widely recognized by local 
populations and rebels as a root cause of the conflict. According to Flint (2007:150) the black 
book provides a detailed account of “where political and economical power in Sudan lies and 
has lain ever since independence- in the hands of a small elite from three tribes who live along 
the Nile north of Khartoum: the Shaygiyya, Ja’aliyiin, and Danagla.  
 
The JEM was definitely more ideologically driven than the SLA. The politics which they 
embraced were more coordinated and sophisticated than those of the SLA, this partly because 
its leaders had acquired more experience while serving under the NIF. Its focus was also more 
on a national level as opposed to being exclusively local. It basically called for a restructuring 
of the entire nation, with a return to Sudan six provinces (South, Darfur, Kordofan, East, North, 
and Central) and a presidency rotating among them. Its official manifesto demanded a federal 
and democratic system of governance, “based on political pluralism, the rule of law, 
independence of the judiciary and the principle of separation of powers” (Flint, 2007: 163).  
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3.5.3     The Janjaweed 
 
The aim of this section is to analyze the origins and the composition of the armed militias in 
Darfur, better known as the Janjaweed. The Janjaweed is a pro-government armed group which 
consists of more than six categories of like-minded actors including: the Peace Forces, the 
Nomad Protection Forces, the Popular Defense Force, the Um Bakha Irregular Forces, and Um 
Kwak Attacker Forces. Excluded from this list are the National Army and the official police 
force which is not directly related to the Janjaweed but who does work closely with them via 
military intelligence, arms provision and indirect cooperation. Up until 2003 these groups were 
only loosely integrated, yet the transformation of these groups into a regularized form known 
as the Janjaweed occurred in 2003, along with the intensification of the rebellion in Darfur and 
the government’s response to the rebellion. It was shortly after the SLA attack on El Fashir that 
the Sudan Armed Forces began a major recruitment operation for the Popular Defense Forces. 
Basically, the government’s response to the rebellion was to organize the entire native 
administration system as one of military command, creating militia units up to the level of 
brigade” (Haggar, 2007: 129). Some of the native administration leaders who have mobilized 
their tribes in political and military support for the government include chiefs from the 
Habbaniya, Misiriya, Hawtiya, and the Tarjam. (Haggar, 2007: 129).   
 
Before proceeding with the study it is important to mention something about the label 
“Janjaweed”, a label which is surprisingly misleading and ambiguous. The term is used 
differently in different parts of Sudan and Darfur, depending on ones tribal affiliation and 
political standpoint. What the term generally denotes is additional armed forces or, put 
differently, the militias mobilized by the government to address the counter-insurgency and 
whose methods and violence of human rights are infamous (Feinstein, 2005: 39). The media 
and the international community has often held a misleading assumption regarding the 
Janjaweed when they held that the “Janjaweed=Arabs=perpetrators of human rights violations” 
(Feinstein, 2005: 39). Among pro-government groups, the term Janjaweed is used to describe 
bandit gangs whose activities are frowned upon and who are considered to be criminals and 
outlaws, not under the authority or control of any tribe. The additional armed forces, on the 
other hand, are men mobilized by their tribes to receive military training, who paid, and who 
come under the indirect control of the government. It is apparent, however, that these groups 
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have participated alongside the regular armed forces in causing gross violations of human 
rights.  
 
When the war in Darfur officially started, many of the Janjaweed bandit gangs returned to their 
own ethnic groups in order to join the additional armed forces recruited by the government. 
Once they were recruited, many of them subsequently resumed their illegal banditry and 
criminal activities. Furthermore, the governments call for additional armed forces extended as 
far as West Africa, and thus a large proportion of those who have joined up are from outside 
the region and so placed even more pressure on the region and its limited resources. Apart from 
these two categories of bandits and additional armed forces, there are also armed Arab groups 
that provide protection (for a price) to villages such as Fur villages in Wadi Bari and Tama and 
Gimir villages around the area of Kebkabiya, and to lorries traveling on the trade routes from 
El Fasher to the border with Kordofan. As mentioned, various other categories of the 
Janjaweed also exist yet due to space and time considerations the study will not include them 
here (Feinstein, 2005: 39). It therefore seems that the purpose of the Janjaweed has a clear link 
with livelihood in terms of membership of the military and opportunities to loot, occupy land 
or operate protection rackets, all of which constitute a source of income in a very marginalized 
region with a very depressed economy. This livelihood linkages form part of the rapidly 
emerging war economy in Darfur, something which have now extended beyond the Janjaweed 
to include rebel groups as well. The incentive for war has become more appealing as the war 
has progressed since 2003 with many actors able to profit out of its structure (Feinstein, 2005: 
39).  
 
Various international bodies such as the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005) 
and Human Rights Watch (2005) provide evidence of the government’s assistance to the 
Janjaweed. Flint and de Waal (2005: 64) notes how there exists clear evidence of how the 
government equipped and trained” the Janjaweed. All the various divisions of the Janjaweed 
mention before also have well established links between themselves. All of these divisions, 
including the Popular Defense force,  the Nomadic Protection Force and the Peace Force 
receive payments from the government and the tribal leader are often included in these 
payments by assisting in the recruitment process of the militias. The tribal leaders are often 
paid in terms of grant or gifts or even the promise of development projects such as schools and 
hospitals in their villages. The following quote illustrate this point: “in July 2003 the state 
called on tribal leaders for help. We called on our people to join the Popular Defense Force. 
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They responded by joining, and started taking orders from the government as part of the state 
military apparatus” (International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 2005: 28). 
 
Arguing in favor of economic incentives for joining the Janjaweed, Human Rights Watch 
(2004) claim that during the beginning of the conflict people didn’t join the Janjaweed based 
on an “ethnic hatred” consideration, but instead based on survival and economic 
considerations. Flint and de Waal (2005: 114) also supports this view when they point to the 
way that “most Darfurians grew poorer, [while] Janjaweed commanders and security officers 
profited from a new economy of loot, extortion and plunder, growing rich on the misery of 
others”. There seems to exist strong indications of opportunistic behavior among the members 
of the Janjaweed and their decision to join the armed movement. This form of opportunistic 
behavior perhaps better explain the violence between different groups, better than primordial 
notions of ethnic hatred. A big problem is the fact that most of these government sponsored 
militias also act independently as a means of obtaining profits, this also achieved via robbery 
and looting.  
 
Another important point to mention is the fact that the process in which the government 
recruited the militia members also greatly contributed to fixing the Arab and African divide in 
Darfur. The recruitment process was done largely on a tribal basis with the government 
recruiting exclusively from the Arab tribes. Furthermore, these Arab tribes were also usually 
the ones who were hardest hit by drought and impoverishment. Flint and de Waal (2005) also 
points that many of these Arab tribes also never had rights to land and as a result were 
therefore easily convinced to join the militias forces and to fight for the government’s cause. 
Poverty and landlessness are powerful driving forces and the government of Sudan seems have 
been aware of this fact when it recruited the Arab tribes. This was how the government was 
able to sell their cause to the Arab tribes as being their cause. Human Rights Watch (2004: 15) 
says that the government offered the impoverished Arab tribes an incentive which they 
couldn’t refuse, “the chance of looting African villages and the opportunity to acquire with 
total impunity the land of communities that some have envied for centuries”.  
 
The International Crisis Group (2006: 8) notes how this selective form of recruitment was 
made even more ethnically exclusive in that the government refused volunteers that didn’t 
belong to Arab tribes. Before the war in Darfur, most of the national army soldiers were 
members of African tribes. When the war started, these soldiers lost their positions and had to 
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seek other forms of employment, thus further aggravating their grievance. Furthermore, in 
order to receive more fighters on their side, the government made use of extensive propaganda 
campaigns in order to convince people of their “Arab origins”. Flint and de Waal (2005: 103) 
sites an example from the Jebel Misseriya tribe who have generally been identified as African 
before the war started. When the war broke out the government attempted to coerce this tribe 
into joining the militia forces. This was achieved primarily by convincing them of their 
apparent Arabic ancestry, “linking members of this tribe to their distant relatives in other areas 
of Darfur and Sudan”. This seems to be very much in line with Brown’s (2001: 4) argument 
that powerful politicians or elites may “reinvent particular versions of history and memory to 
construct new cultural forms that can be used for political mobilization”.   
 
The most unfortunate aspect of the government’s strategy of mobilizing supporters based on 
exclusive ethnic identities is the effect which it has on ordinary civilians. The International 
Commission of Inquiry (2005: 64) and other international bodies all observed similar tactics 
employed by the Janjaweed and their unofficial government allies. The tactics employed by the 
Janjaweed are greatly strengthened by means of military intelligence sharing with the 
government, through arms provision by the government army and neighboring countries such 
as Libya and Chad, and through direct technical and military support from the government. A 
standard attack on a civilian village would usually involve heavy air raids and bombardment 
with government helicopters. This is usually followed by members of the Janjaweed, generally 
operating on horseback or camels, who then resume looting and burning the villages, killing or 
expelling the inhabitance and claiming the land and its livestock for themselves. Recently the 
Janjaweed has upgraded their modus operandi via jeeps, rocket launchers, and semi-automatic 
weapons, mostly sponsored by the government. Since the war started in 2003 it is estimated 
that Janjaweed have been responsible for the forced displacement of more than 2 million 
Darfurian people and more than 400 000 deaths (Human Rights Watch, 2006). The information 
provided here seems to indicate that the violence currently being witnessed in Darfur isn’t 
merely the result of Arab and African hatred, but rather, the calculated actions of the 
government of Sudan via its use of the Arab groups. This seems to be what is causing the real 
division in Darfur.  
 
Looking at the recruitment process based on notions of ethnicity such as “Arab” and the 
selection of individuals and groups based on their willingness to fight against a clearly 
demarked ethnic other, “Africans”, it seems very likely that the government of Sudan 
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deliberately induced the fierce ethnic division present in Darfur today, division which before 
the war where much more passive. It would seem that what the government achieved via its 
counter-insurgency strategy was to weaken the rebel movements, yet at the same time, dividing 
the Darfurians and creating a conflict along strict ethnic lines. The following quote by Mueller 
(200: 2) illustrates what has so far been discussed: “the violence seems to have been the result 
of a situation in which common, opportunistic, sadistic, and often distinctly non-ideological 
marauders were recruited and permitted free rein by political authorities”.  
 
The composition and the conduct of the Janjaweed therefore bares very little resemblance to 
nationalist movements present in the “old wars” with all members of a group standing behind a 
common ideological cause. Instead, the violence one sees in Darfur today is more the result of 
propaganda campaigns by a small minority of people, as opposed to a whole ethnic group 
fighting against another, united by an ideological cause. What the government of Sudan was 
able to achieve was to “[deflect] the discontent of the one ethnic group by turning their 
frustrations against another ethnic group” (Keen, 2000).   So far, it seems that the conflicts are 
more the result of the use of these groups rather than it being the outcome of feelings of 
primordial ethnic hatred sentiments. The government and its role in causing the conflict will be 
discussed in chapter 4, for this study regards the government more as a factor in the conflict 
than as an actor.  
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Chapter 4:          The Factors contributing to the conflict 
 
Taking another look at the ethnic hatred explanation for conflict, the main question that this 
study raises in response to this explanation is why these different ethnic groups have been able 
to coexist and live peacefully together for such a long time prior to the current era. So far the 
paper has also questioned the common tendency of the media and government officials to label 
the conflict as a tribal one or as a consequence of ecological degradation and the consequent 
resource scarcity resulting from this. These elements have, no doubt, contributed to the current 
tension in Darfur and both of these factors are, to a certain extent, part of the conflict. Disputes 
are inevitable whenever different communities share the same natural resources. Whether and 
how they are transformed into violent conflict depends, according to de Waal (2007: 31) upon 
the means of peripheral governance adopted.  
 
This chapter seeks to analyze the conflict in Darfur within the context of the political and 
economic realm, wherein the government situated in Khartoum plays an essential role. The 
government of Sudan’s strategy toward Darfur and its rebel movements has often been referred 
to as a “scorched-earth policy”. The idea under this strategy is to eradicate the insurgency 
movement by not just attacking the rebels, but also the civilian population on which the rebels 
often depend for their supplies, shelter, and as a general support and recruitment base. The 
physical effect of this strategy has been devastating with the loss of countless innocent lives 
and the forced expulsion of millions from their homeland.  
 
Worse than the physical effect of this scorched earth strategy, has been the division amongst 
the ethnic groups in Darfur which the government has sown. The previous chapter illustrated 
how the government’s use of the Janjaweed as a counter-insurgency force can be seen as a 
divide and conquer strategy which had the result of pitting Arabs tribes against African tribes 
and so giving the conflict a distinct ethnic character. By exclusively mobilizing and arming 
dissatisfied and impoverished Arab tribes against African tribes, the government of Sudan 
exploited the tensions which were already present in Darfur. This strategy, in the end, led to the 
gradual militarization of the different tribes in the entire region of Darfur and only served to 
further alienate the African groups from the government. The militia and their tendency for 
savage type of behavior will be explained in this thesis beyond merely noting that they are 
apart of the war. Instead, the argument will be made that the tribal militias are more than a 
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cheap toll of counterinsurgency but that they should be seen as a key strategy of the central 
government of governing the peripheries.  
 
The chapter to follow will describe the factors which played a role in causing the current war in 
Darfur. Looking beyond the “ancient ethnic hatred” or purely ecological explanations, the 
study will look for the causes of the conflict in areas such as the over-dominant political center 
in Khartoum, the weak state structure, the regional neglect and marginalization of the 
peripheral areas. This chapter will attempt to draw a link between these factors and the 
militarization of ethnicity in Darfur. This chapter will also attempt to draw a link between these 
factors and the privatization of military force and the type of conduct which goes with the 
privatization and ethnicization of force.  
 
4.1     The over-dominant center 
 
The government of Sudan (GOS) is based in the capital Khartoum. Currently the government is 
dominated by the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), which was previously known as the 
National Islamic Front (NIF), and is generally understood to be an Islamist regime with a 
policy of “full Islamisation” for the whole of Sudan (Cook, Mironko, 2006: 128). The current 
president of Sudan is Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir and came to power in 1989 via a military 
coup.  In the north, the traditional political parties are, among others, the Umma Party (which 
has split into the Umma Party, Umma Party Reform and Renewal, and Federal Umma Party), 
the Sudan Communist Party, The National Islamic Front and the Democratic Unionist Party. 
The Umma Party represents the mainstream opposition, which together with the Unionist 
Parties constitute the largest parties in the north. Although all of these northern parties have 
different political agendas and ideologies, they all strongly advocate the unity of Sudan and 
exhibit a dedicated commitment and refusal to a move to federal government and power 
sharing arrangements (Sherif & Ibrahim, 2006: 46).  
 
In line with the new warfare framework, this thesis argues that the “hyper-dominance” of 
Khartoum over Darfur and other peripheral areas forms one of the most important realities in 
Sudan and in the war in Darfur today (de Waal, 2007: 4). The capital of Khartoum and its close 
surroundings consists of a more or less middle-income closed society which is surrounded by 
provinces such as Darfur that are not only poor but are also suffering from development 
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processes basically running in reverse. It is possible to construct a sharp contrast between the 
centre and the periphery by highlighting how the center possesses immense private wealth, a 
class of skilled professionals, and a political culture that has a strong liberal tradition. In 
contrast, the periphery exhibit not only overall poverty but are also subjected to processes of 
subjugation and exploitation. The Black Book which was published in 2000 by members of the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) employs a similar kind of critique of central power in 
Sudan (de Waal, 2007:4).  
 
The Black Book: Imbalances of Power and Wealth in Sudan, which is officially available on 
the web-page of the JEM, supports most of the claims made above. The validity of the Black 
Book has also been verified and approved by scholars such as Cobham (2005) who compares 
the content of the Black Book with official economic, social, and political data released by 
large international organizations such as the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank. According to 
the Black Book (2000), prior to its first publication in 2000, there were 24.7 hospital beds per 
100,000 people in Darfur and 151 per 100,000 people in the northern region. Since 1957, all of 
the prime ministers and presidents in Sudan were from a northern community, this being 
shocking in that the northern area constitutes no more than 5 percent of the total population of 
Sudan. Also in terms of medical care, it was found that there were 1.9 available doctors in 
Darfur per 100,000 people, whilst in the north there were 13.4 doctors available per 100,000 
people. In terms of primary school enrolment, 31 percent of Darfurian children attend, whilst in 
the north, 88 percent of children attend. These examples go on and on and include equally stark 
contrasts in most other development fields, including the general lack of transport, 
infrastructure and agricultural development projects.  
 
Like many other developing countries therefore, Darfur is marked by extreme inequality. 
National economic statistics indicate that about half the nation’s income and assets rests in the 
capital of Khartoum, which contains less than 20 percent of the population. This figure rose 
from 8 percent in 1980, indicating a rapid urbanization rate. Also, about three-quarters of the 
countries health professionals are located in the capital. The surrounding area qualifies as a 
“least developed country” in which the majority of people live in absolute poverty. Flint (2005) 
mentions two versions of this “center-periphery” argument where the first argues that there 
exists a “deliberate and consistent conspiracy by an administrative, military, and commercial 
establishment to exploit the provinces”. According to this view, the war in Darfur can be seen 
as a continuation of historical processes of asset stripping and proletarianization of the rural 
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populations. This process had begun in the 19th century and had continued up to current date. 
This view corresponds closely with the view held by many that war is only continuation of 
primary accumulation including land seizure using military organizations (Flint, 2005; de 
Waal, 2005; Wallerstein, 1984). By looking at the different actors discussed in chapter 3, it 
becomes apparent that primary accumulation does indeed play a large role in the conflict with 
both militia forces and rebels often operating with the sole incentive of looting and land 
seizure. Furthermore, the government’s assistance to the Janjaweed only serves to regularize 
this form of conduct, therefore making it an entrenched feature of Sudan, especially since the 
war started. The sections to follow will elaborate on this view by illustrating how the elite 
faction in the North of the country deliberately seek to keep areas such as Darfur in a state of 
conflict and how they benefit from the violent ethnic divisions in the region.  
 
The second argues that the extreme center-periphery inequalities exhibited in Sudan are a result 
of the logical and natural outcome of specific historical imbalances of power and wealth in the 
country, inequalities inherited from previous colonial powers and conquerors. It differs from 
the first view in that it holds that no “conspiracies” exist but rather that the operations of 
merchant capital have had the greatest determining influence. Various authors such a Shanon 
(1974) and Wallerstein (1984) have argued in favor of this form of historical determinism 
which argues that those who have already accumulated capital will continue to do so, at the 
expense of those who have only their labor to sell, often lacking even recognized title to their 
own land.  (Flint, de Waal, 2005; Wallerstein, 1984, Shannon, 1974). As mentioned in chapter 
3, Darfur has a long history of inequality and regional marginalization starting with the Fur 
Sultanate and extending right through to the post-independence era. It is uncertain therefore to 
what extent the marginalization in Darfur is the result of deliberate and consistent conspiracy 
by an administrative, military, and commercial establishments to exploit the provinces or 
whether it is the result of the logical and natural outcome of specific historical imbalances of 
power and wealth in the country, inequalities inherited from previous colonial powers and 
conquerors. The following section will look more closely at the current actors within the 
government of Sudan and attempt to shed more light on the problem raised above.  
 
Perhaps more important than determining exactly where Darfur’s marginalization originated is 
the realization that this over-dominance displayed by the national capital of Sudan has various 
and far reaching implications for the conflict in Darfur, both socially, economically and 
politically. The values which prevail in Khartoum, whether socially, politically, or 
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economically, have come to form the standard by which the rest of the country is obliged to 
adhere to. For example, all the leading educational and cultural institutions and all the 
countries electronic and print media are situated in the capital. Therefore, only the capital has 
the infrastructure to establish and support a modern functional political party, or at least more 
so than the periphery (de Waal, 2007:10).  
 
As mentioned before, the details of Sudan’s national inequalities are clearly documented in the 
JEM’s Black Book, with the book openly criticizing the marginalization of the counties’ 
peripheral areas. For example, the book also raises the topic of agricultural policy and by using 
the concept of I’mar Alarad, or land development, it argues that such policies should be 
entrusted to the governing authorities of the country. According to Jooma (2006: 16), the 
importance of this challenge to authority highlights the fallacy of situating the conflict within 
an absolute racial paradigm of Arab versus African interests. By moving beyond this 
dichotomy one is able to see that the centralization of political power by Khartoum has various 
implications on local conditions in Darfur, conditions which led to the polarization of 
communities base on ethnicity. The weak capacity of regional authorities to deal with practical 
realities has also been a major contributing factor in the uprising, this will be discussed below.  
 
4.2     The weak center 
 
Another main factor which this study considers involves the realization that the political 
history of Sudan exhibits an almost “inherent inability of any one elite faction to establish 
unchallenged and legitimate political dominance over the state”. Some authors, such as de 
Waal (2007), note how the center possesses sufficient economic, social, cultural, and political 
infrastructure so that it can support not only one but multiple elite groups. In the post-
independence context where these various contending groups competed for power, none were 
ever able to dominate the others, leading to chronic political instability. Sudan, like many 
African countries, is a country which has shifted, time after time, between civilian and military 
rule with the parliamentary coalitions which did exist being extremely frail. Even under the 
presidency of Jaafar Nimeiri, which displayed a remarkable longevity in his rule, personal 
continuity at the top state level usually masked the many internal problems which the state 
faced. Also, since the coup in 1989 under President Bashir, Sudan has been ruled under the 
hand of military men in power which have masked the multiple competing power centers in 
Khartoum and the “frequent reconfigurations within the ruling group” (de Waal, 2007: 5).  
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The lack of internal political cohesion in Khartoum has not completely disrupted all functional 
elements within the state structure. The elites in Sudan have always been able to maintain the 
basic socio-cultural and economic dominance in the country and also the collective control 
over the countries’ political and economic institutions. What it hasn’t been unable to assure, 
however, is a leadership efficiently strong to achieve peace and sustain a consistent set of 
economic and governance strategies. This instability is best illustrated and materialized in the 
countries’ peripheries and it has made it extremely hard to build or to maintain a stable 
mechanism of provincial governance. The provincial elites have therefore been unable 
establish the political infrastructure necessary to enable a means of challenging the dominance 
of the center. Furthermore, the provincial elites have also been unable to establish stable 
clientelistic relations with the center, which is in a perpetual state of fluctuation (de Waal, 
2007: 5).  
 
Another result of this persistent and perpetual lack of central cohesion has been that the center 
has also been unable to pursue any long term political strategies whereas politicians and 
governments institutions have become highly skilled at maintaining and addressing short-term 
crisis management. Normal state functions which would, in normal conditions, all have a 
medium to long term focus and execution, have become instead focused on the short run and 
crisis management level. Some of these functions include economic policy, foreign relations, 
administrative reform, and most important for this study, counter-insurgency. Furthermore, 
different parts of the government and ruling party might also be conducting different and often 
competing policies at the same time. The final result has been “the greater freedom given to 
politicians and elites eager to adopt low-cost, ad hoc approaches to managing security”. Worth 
noting here is the security officers who are in charge of the “militia strategy of fostering tribal 
irregulars” (de Waal, 2007: 5). It might seem accurate here to refer to the government’s use of 
the Janjaweed against the rebels as a form of “counter-insurgency on the cheap”, a term which 
will be used throughout the remainder of the study (de Waal, 2004). 
 
Since Bashir’s coup in 1989 there has been a notable degree of continuity among the 
individuals at the height of state power, especially the security officials close to the president. 
This continuity at the top, however, is masked by the reality of multiple power centers in 
Khartoum. My scholars have argued that the most important form of politics to the regime 
since the earliest days of the Islamist government has been the internal politics for power such 
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as between the security apparatus and the civilian cadres, and among leading individuals and 
the government. The actions by the most powerful men in the government are very often 
driven by the need to “outmaneuver a rival within the ruling circle” (de Waal, 2007: 14). One 
must recognize how difficult it is for rivals to organize to take power in a system with multiple 
power centers. The NCP’s hold on power can therefore largely be seen to stem from its power 
of patronage. The elites in Khartoum are united by a common interest in holding onto state 
power and they are all make sure that their internal disagreements do not in any way jeopardize 
their collective hold on power (symbolized by the presidency of Bashir). Flint (2005) makes an 
appropriate statement when she exclaims how it would be unlikely for the governing elite to 
achieve anything more than “to sit atop a paralyzed state system, making money, dispensing 
patronage, and managing their recurrent crises”. 
 
A big problem and vulnerability for the government of Sudan is military affairs. The central 
elites’ dominance of the economy has definitely not meant that it has been able to establish 
“effective state institutions that exercise effective coercion across all Sudanese territory” (de 
Waal, 2007: 36). The basic consequence of this reality has been that the ruling elites are always 
fearful that a rebellion, such as presented by JEM and the SLA, could run out of control. Those 
statesmen who are responsible for the security of the regime have, for this reason, been granted 
immense power and impunity and are able to employ whatever means necessary in order to 
counter the resistance. The extent of impunity which have been extended to the government 
forces and their Janjaweed allies has been startling and, considering the consequences this 
strategy has had on the regions ethnic relations, has been most alarming. Kaldor (2006) would 
argue that the government’s lack of legitimate monopoly of violence in the country has 
resulted in the ruling classes adopting other strategies in order to counter any form of 
insurgency. Due to a lack in sufficient financial resources, adequate military budgets, and 
sufficient man power, the government of Sudan therefore found that mobilizing the tribal 
militias was the only option which would not disrupt its current ( and highly beneficial for 
most) status quo.  
 
Another important factor has to do with the government’s denial of any relations, involvement 
or support for the Janjaweed. By claiming that it is not involved, the government is therefore 
able shed any responsibility for the atrocities which have been committed by the militias. 
Another important fact, directly related to the above, is that the government of Sudan has 
persistently labeled the conflict in Darfur as “merely a tribal conflict” or a “tribal war”. It has 
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forcefully denied any notions of the war constituting genocide or having its causes in political 
and economic factors. The following quote by vice-president Ali Osman, documented by 
International Crisis Group (2006: 9), proves this claim: “we are dealing with a typical situation 
which is very common in Africa”. Such a claim quite clearly denies any government 
involvement. Furthermore, the government’s actual use of the Janjaweed served to create the 
conditions in which the conflict did take on ethnic overtones, and so made it much easier for 
the government and also the international community to label the conflict as purely ethnic or 
tribal.  
 
4.3     Center versus periphery Bargaining 
 
The over-dominant center in Sudan, coupled with the unstable political center, has as a result a 
very particular type of center-periphery political bargaining which, in turn, helps to explain the 
pattern and persistence of violence in Darfur. The central elite faction needs the provincial 
elites for two primary reasons: votes and militia. Although the provinces are economically 
somewhat insignificant they nonetheless command the largest electorate, and when elections 
are held, their votes are needed to deliver a ruling majority. Because no central elite party can 
expect to generate support on account of its record on welfare or development, they rather 
votes through sectarian and ethnic allegiances. In parallel to this, the low-cost means of 
policing the peripheries and growing counterinsurgency is through tribal militia. To pursue 
either of these strategies, the intermediary of a loyal or dependable provincial leader is 
required. It is also the central government who controls the appointment of native 
administrators and it can therefore easily play on the rivalries between traditional and radical 
provincial elites (de Waal, 2007: 25).  
 
Authors such as Flint (2008) have identified two strategies followed by provincial politicians 
of which the most common is to attach oneself to part of the central elite, cutting a deal in 
which votes and militia are delivered in return for a place in the administration and/or 
commercial opportunities. In the career of a provincial politician it is common to see him 
attaching himself to a succession of elite blocks , looking for the best deal. Darfurians, for 
example, have bounced from the Umma Party to the army to the Islamist and even the to the 
Unionist bloc, and the SPLM, all in different sequences. This strategy has the inevitable result 
that the provincial elite members fail to organize a common platform and that they become 
corrupt and politically discredited (Flint, 2008). The second strategy is to seek the sponsorship 
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of another government. An example of this would be the SPLM backed by countries such as 
Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, and the US. The Darfurian rebels, for example, have been backed 
and financially supported by Chad, Libya, and Eritrea and also the SPLA. This strategy has the 
disadvantage that it severely compromises the autonomy of the client provincial leaders, for 
example, the Darfur rebels’ freedom of political maneuver is circumscribed by Chad (Flint, 
2008).   
 
The above clearly illustrates the form of political bargaining occurring between the center and 
the periphery. De Waal (2007) describes this pattern as the “circulation of provincial elite 
members” or as a “divide and rule strategy by the government”. Flint (2008) describes this 
pattern as “opportunistic political-survival strategies by fragmented and dependent rural elite 
leaders”. This form of bargaining also has a definite resemblance to the neo-patrimonial form 
of state conduct unique to so many African countries and also seems to be quite consistent with 
the idea that African states “instrumentalize disorder” (Schatzberg, 2001). Some authors also 
refer to this form of statehood in Sudan as the “turbulent state hypothesis” and it can certainly 
be used in this thesis to demonstrate important characteristics regarding the origin and the 
nature of ethnic and identity politics and also the nature of conflict over natural resources and 
why the war is fought in such a brute manner (de Waal, 2007: 24). 
 
4.4     Ethnically Biased Administration  
 
The government of Sudan has also consciously used other means to induced community 
divisions in order to counter any opposition to its hegemonic rule. One way in which this was 
achieved was through altering the local political configuration of Darfur to suit Khartoum’s 
interests rather than those of the local population. In 1994, Darfur was divided into three states: 
North, South and West Darfur. By separating the region into three different administrative 
units, the government also very tactically made the Fur tribe a minority in each of these units, 
where previously it had been the majority in the region. The government basically split the 
land of the Fur and therefore greatly reduced their power and influence. Furthermore, the new 
local positions which were opened up by the forging of the three new states were all filled by 
members of the Arab tribes. This political maneuver was part of a national process in 1994 that 
divided the 9 states of Sudan into 26 regions in addition to the creation of 72 provinces from 
the original 18 provinces. According to International Crisis Group (2004), this “slicing up of 
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authority, rather than devolving authority to the grassroots as was claimed, stretched the states’ 
meager resources thinly over a much inflated public sector that was unable to deliver basic 
social services”. By dividing the region in this manner and stripping one tribe of its authority 
while granting another that same authority, the government of Sudan also blatantly contributed 
to raising the community divisions (Flint & de Waal, 2005: 58).  
 
Also, the introduction of the Land Act by President Nimieri in 1970 greatly contributed to the 
current status of farmers and nomads in Darfur today. What the Land Act entailed was that all 
unregistered land, whether this land was being occupied or not, would from that stipulated date 
become government property. This act was truly unfortunate for many farmers and nomads in 
the peripheral regions in that most of their land were unregistered, and therefore, suddenly 
belonged to the government. The significance of this act was that access and rights to land 
suddenly had to be pursued through political channels and concept of ownership became much 
more prominent and problematic. According to Johnson (2003: 130), “land became a 
commodity with potential high value, which prioritized access for the country’s elite”. Johnson 
further notes how “the unregistered Land Act abolished customary rights of land use and 
access to land and set the formation for the central state’s leasing of land for large-scale 
farming schemes”.  
 
Another important point, directly related to the above, involves the government support for the 
initiation of mechanized agriculture. This initiative, as part of the Land Act, was greatly 
beneficial to the rich and elite farmers who were able to greatly profit from the economies of 
scale which mechanized farming enables. This scheme, however, proved to be extremely 
disruptfull to the small farmer who practiced subsistence agriculture and also for the nomads in 
Darfur. Duffield (1990: 5) estimates that “the land use by 8000 richer farmers was equivalent 
to the same area that had to be shared by 2.5 million poorer traditional farmers. This unjust 
division of land had to a large extent contributed to raising the level grievance in Darfur and 
also further contributed to conflicts between different tribes over access to natural resources. 
These problems were also coupled with the increasing ecological degrading of the region and 
so served to create a context within which people could easily be mobilized by powerful actors 
promising commercial gain and access to resources. Flint & de Waal (2005: 9) note how this 
situation was severely aggravated by the fact that some Arab tribes had never had rights to land 
and that “to this day, many Abbala Arabs explain their involvement in the current conflict in 
terms of this 250-year-old search for land granted to the Baggara but denied to them”.  
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Although ecological explanations for the conflict fall out of the scope of this study, it is till 
important to realize how increasing desertification of Darfur coincided with both the reduction 
of arable land and rainfall, and “the emasculation of administrative structures to mediate 
sedentary and nomadic people of Darfur” (Jooma, 2006: 16). Although this point has been 
mentioned, it is worth noting how the abolishment of the native administration system in 1971 
by President Jaffer Nimieri led to a situation where there was no longer any credible authority 
in place to intervene in the complex and growing socio-economic crisis in Darfur, leaving the 
path open to the militarization of groups to defend their interests. The tribal administration 
system was responsible for maintaining tribal relations, allocating of land for agriculture or 
grazing purposes and administering local courts as centers of conflict resolution. The system 
therefore served as a good mediating force between the different communities. When the 
government abolished this system, it directly provoked the already fragile relations in the 
region in a deconstructive way.   
 
4.5     Politicized identities  
 
A key aspect of this study is determining what exactly changed in Darfur in terms of the 
divisions in ethnicity which became so apparent since the early 1990s. Scholars such as Barth 
(1994: 12) says that in order to understand this change one must realize that “ the mobilization 
of ethnic groups into collective action is effected by leaders who pursue a political enterprise, 
and is not a direct expression of the groups’ cultural ideology, or the popular will”. It is 
therefore important to note how the state and the elite actors functioning within its disarray 
construct identities and how they have manipulated ethnicity and peoples perception of 
ethnicity in order to achieve their goals. In this sense, the main objective of the Sudanese 
government is to “maintain power at all costs” (Prendergast, 2005). The current war in Darfur, 
since its inception, represents a greater risk to the government and elites in Khartoum than the 
war with the South ever did. This is because the rebel movements symbolizes a break within 
the Muslim community, and it seems that the government was willing to use whatever means 
necessary to win the battle, even if it meant firing up an ethnic conflict in the region. When the 
government consciously decided to arm Arab tribes against African tribes, it inherently 
manipulated the ethnic fabric in Darfur to suit its own will. This task was made all the more 
easier due to grievance experienced by the marginalized Arab tribes and their eagerness for 
commercial gain, whether it be stolen land, stolen livestock, or government remittance.  
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Furthermore, the government, by using this strategy, succeeded in “localizing and redirecting 
grievances so that it is no longer the target” (International Crisis Group, 2006: 4). 
 
The rebellion in Darfur also represented a greater threat to Khartoum in that the government 
feared that the rebellion might spread to other marginalized and disaffected regions of the 
country. Various other provinces, especially those in the north close to the border with Egypt, 
also expressed similar grievances and made similar demands for regional development and 
government attention. It is likely that the government feared that the rebellion in Darfur would 
set an example for other regions and spark an even greater uprising, one that the weak 
government would surely be unable to control. In order to prevent the spiraling of the rebellion 
into a full-on national crisis, as apposed to an exclusively regional one, the government felt that 
it had to deal swiftly with the situation (Ibrahim, 2004: 13). The solution which it sought to the 
problem also had to be one which did not include a power sharing arrangement between the 
government and the regional actors (as this would have shattered the favorable status quo of 
the central elite), nor could it be a solution demanding high military costs, as the governments 
available resources were already thinly stretched by the war with the south and a struggling 
economy. The most favorable option for the government was therefore the use of the 
Janjaweed in smothering the rebellion. The implications which this course of action held for 
the region and its inhabitance were not of great concern for the government. Of greater concern 
was holding on to power.  
 
Another factor which might also have played a crucial role in the conflict has to do with what 
Brown (2001: 17) calls “elite power struggles” and how these struggles have a direct baring on 
conflict situations. His argument is basically that conflicts such as Darfur can often be seen as 
the direct outcome of the actions of domestic elites who are able to stir violence based on their 
own personal power struggles. One example which illustrates this argument involves Dr. 
Hassan Al-Turabi, who has generally been considered the architect of modern Islamism in 
Sudan and had been a major political actor in Sudan since the 1960s as a member of the 
Islamic Charter Front, an organization that took its inspiration from Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood and which first proposed the drafting of an Islamic constitution for Sudan. In its 
beginning stages the Islamic Charter Front consisted mostly of riverine Arabs and Darfurians.  
 
The Darfurians have long been known for their devotedness to Islam and they saw “the 
association with Turabi as the convergence of issues of identity with an opportunity to make 
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gains on the national political front”. Realizing this, Turabi sought to unify the Darfurians 
against the monopolization of state politics by the two Sufi order families, the Khatmiya and 
Ansar, in a way that would “isolate their economically powerful elites and provide him with a 
constituency” (Jooma, 2006: 5). Put differently, the Darfurians basically saw the Islamist 
movement as a “route to forging links to the centre and enfranchisement” while Turabi saw 
Islam as a means of building a constituency in Darfur (Feinstein, 2005).  
 
Since then, Turabi has also been greatly involved in the shaping of various regimes in Sudan, 
including that of the Nimeiri, Mahdi and the current NIF regime and has acted as a mentor to 
President Omar Al-Bashir. Turabi, according to International Crisis Group (2006: 6), has made 
an incredible mark upon Sudan’s ideological landscape. His ideas, however, became quite 
threatening for the stability of the new political elite, particularly because they related to the 
power-sharing or federal system of government in Sudan (ideas very similar to the manifesto 
of the two rebel movements). Such a system would not only undermine the power of the 
centralized ruling clique, but it would also compromise their economic interests as 
beneficiaries of large state-funded agricultural and industrial schemes. The Islamist movement 
therefore has a great effect on the social political situation in Sudan and Darfur.  
 
In 2000, a dispute over the question of federal devolution led to Parliament being dissolved by 
President Bashir, and in the following year Turabi and some of his followers were charged and 
arrested under the claim that they were undermining the state. Since his release in 2005, Turabi 
has become a strong critique of the current regime. Because of his strong ideological influence 
on Darfurians, his discontent with Khartoum has been associated with the simultaneous rise of 
the JEM. Jooma ( 2006: 5) argues that the conflict in Darfur presents a case study for what 
many observers see as the “battle for the soul of political Islam in Sudan”. Many analysts argue 
that Turabi might have managed to manipulate the masses in Darfur against the government for 
his own purpose to return to power. De Almeida (2007: 31) argues that Turabi, who had full 
knowledge of the situation and the sentiments in Darfur, appears to have used these grievances 
in order to mobilize his people and regain his position of power. This argument is very much in 
line with that made by Brown (2001: 17) when he says that “[the] decision and actions of 
domestic elite often determine whether political disputes veer towards war or peace”.  The 
government’s use of the Janjaweed to divide the people in Darfur, in turn, may then also be 
seen as both a means to weaken the insurgency movement and also as a convenient means keep 
Turabi out of national politics.  
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4.6     State financing and Privatization of force  
 
A problem for the government and central elites of Sudan and for the research question of this 
thesis is how the state manages to finance its military activity and the patronage system which 
it has in place, this in the face of the growing financial crisis in the country largely due to rising 
foreign debt.  It has largely been established that Sudan’s, and most developing countries for 
that matter, domestic revenue collection system is largely inefficient and the country is also 
typically able to capture only a  small percentage of the payments from expatriate workers. 
Sudan’s national budget has been in decline since 1978, shrinking below $900 million per 
annum in 1990.  
Of this amount more or less $400 million per year were spent on the army and security. In 
1999, this figure had dropped even further to $240 million per year.  
 
The discovery of oil revenues in late 1999 allowed Sudan to dramatically escape from its 
liquidity crisis. Since it began exporting oil its national budget has risen from $900 million to 
over $11 billion. In turn, this has allowed substantial increases in the official spending on the 
army. The new funds have not, however, resolved the underlying problems of the Sudanese 
state. The prospect of oil revenues only sharpened the rivalry between the state and the parties 
over who should control regime finances. For president Bashir to keep all the different elite 
factions within the ruling coalition happy means he must allow them to control a substantial 
amount of the oil revenue streams. Furthermore, oil revenues are still insufficient to cure the 
states’ dept problem. Sudan’s current gross external dept remains at well over $26 billion 
making oil revenues largely insufficient. Put simply, the country’s available finances are not 
enough to finance a war. For this reason governments in the past have pursued different 
strategies in order to finance the war (de Waal, 2007:18).  
 
One such strategy was to seek external finance such as during the financial crisis period (1978-
1985) under Nimeiri’s rule in which the government exploited its position as a Cold War ally 
of Washington to obtain concessions from the US treasury and the IMF. Another has been to 
find alternative sources of foreign money such as, for example, during the war in Sudan when 
Nimeiri campaigned for the option of oil companies directly financing militia and mercenaries 
in their areas of operation. Another example would be when Sadiq el Mahdi traveled to Arab 
countries to seek both government and private contributions for the armed forces’ mobilization 
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to recapture the Kurmuk area of the Blue Nile, which had fallen to the SPLA. Most significant 
in this category of state finance is probably the efforts made by the Islamists from 1990 
onwards to open their doors to Arabic and Islam non-state organizations. Usama bin Laden was 
one of the many who assisted in Sudan’s refinancing. A wide range of other Islamic 
philanthropic organizations, Islamic banks, and private companies provided extensive support 
to military training, weapons purchase and manufacture, infrastructural development, and 
military operations. What this means is that Sudan was therefore able to sustain a major 
military mobilization for years despite a stagnant or shrinking official military budget (de 
Waal, 2007:19).  
 
Another, third, approach to the finance of war in Sudan has been privatization. What is meant 
under privatization is “fighting the war in a cheap and self-financing manner” using militias 
and support from local business interest. This factor has had profound implications for the 
nature of war and has also had important consequences for the cohesion of the state. This 
strategy of using militias have been called “counter-insurgency on the cheap” and has resulted 
in massive and continuous violations of human rights in Darfur and other regions of the Sudan 
(de Waal, 2004). Furthermore, this form of privatization has also locked the central 
government of Khartoum’s war strategy into the agenda’s of other groups such as local armed 
groups and also armed factions coming from outside Sudan.  
 
This financing of joint operations by the militia and army has created a situation in which 
militia leaders, merchants, and military officials worked together to profit from the war. This 
profiting is primarily achieved by raiding cattle, selling timber, smuggling ivory, and by 
making extra large returns from the inflated price of grains and other essential products in the 
towns. This situation reached its pinnacle in 2005 when the Janjawiid of Western Darfur 
emerged as a parallel military authority able to challenge the army and hold the government 
hostage to its agendas (de Waal, 2004). Looking at the cost of war, both in terms of military 
expenditure and in terms of revenues that were missed out on, it makes sense that the 
government should feel compelled to seek peace. Instead, however, because of the 
privatization of the war finance the war has been made much harder to resolve.  By arming 
militias, the dynamics conflict is left outside the control of central government.   
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4.7     Regional Factors: Chad and Libya   
 
Although somewhat on the periphery of this study, it might prove helpful to briefly mention 
something about the greater regional dynamic of the conflict. This factor will only be discussed 
in terms of the arms and manpower provision by neighboring states, and the role played by 
foreign Arab ideologies and how it played a role in leading to the current war in Darfur. Darfur 
shares a long border with Chad. Chad is also the traditional homeland of the Zaghawa clan who 
also constitute a large proportion of the Darfuri population. The president of Chad, Idriss 
Derby, is also an ethnic Zaghawa. In Chad, however, the Zaghawa are a minority. The tribes 
living on either side of the Chad-Darfur border are therefore closely related by ethnicity, 
culture and intermarriage. This make both of these regions a natural refuge for its neighbor in 
times of conflict and strife. More so, it also makes both of these territories a perfect staging 
ground for insurrection against the neighbor’s rulers. Since the early 1960, an especially during 
the 1990 over-through of the Habri regime by now president Derby, Darfur has been the 
launching pad for insurgency, civil war and regime change in Chad. In April 2006, Chadian 
rebels groups attempted to capture the capital of Chad prior to the national elections. The 
government of Chad afterwards alleged that captured rebels has Sudanese identification an that 
Sudan had supported the attacks, a claim which Khartoum denies. Furthermore, reports by 
Human Rights Watch strongly suggests the existence of military and intelligence links between 
Chad rebels, Janjaweed and Sudan army forces in Darfur and Astern Chad (Kajee, 2006:78). 
De Waal (2004) deems Darfur’s bordering with Chad as “a geographical misfortune”. This 
close relationship between the two countries and its various groups have greatly fueled the 
conflict in Darfur in terms of arms provision and military recruitment for both the rebels and 
the Janjaweed.  
  
The “thirty years war” in Africa between Libya and Chad which lasted from 1960 to 1989 has 
also affected Darfur in various ways. Libyan and Chadian opposition groups, and the 
government of Sudan all used Darfur as a training ground and an recruitment area from which 
to attack Chad. The presence of these fighters along with the proliferation of small arms, and 
also the need to settle refugees intensified conflicts over the already scarce natural resources, in 
particular land and water. This conflict between Chad and Libya was especially damaging 
during the 1980s when Chadian tribes sought refuge in Darfur amongst similar tribal members 
(Harir, 1994: 163). At the same time Libya was also recruiting soldiers from other parts of the 
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Sahelian belt which were all trained and armed in Darfur to form autonomous attack squads 
(called “Islamic Legions”) with the aim of causing chaos in Chad (Flint and de Waal, 2005: 
23).  
 
President Gaddafi of Libya also generated an Arabist propaganda which encouraged nomadic 
tribe people to identify themselves as Arabs while regarding farmers as “Zurga” (black). This 
form of “Arab propaganda” certainly contributed to changes in the nomadic tribes’ view of 
themselves and their surroundings and also their history (Rolandsen, 2007: 155). This 
propaganda encouraged them to see themselves as belonging to the histrorical tradition of 
Islam and the Arab expansion into Africa, which justified the rule of Arabs over black Africans 
(and not vice versa). These views and propaganda where all presented and promoted in what 
was called the “Green Book” and by the “Arab Gathering” (Flint and de Waal, 2005). It is very 
possible to argue that this form of Libyan propaganda contributed to making the pastoralists 
much more assertive vis-à-vis the agriculturalists and to provoking their rebellion against a 
“perceived subordination to the Fur and farming tribes” (Rolandsen, 2007:157).  
 
Under his grand vision of Arab a pan-Arab Union, Muammar Gaddafi has often used Darfur to 
support Islamist Chadian uprisings and in this the process exacerbating ethnic tensions in the 
region as well as bringing about resentment amongst Darfuris for both Libyans and Chadians. 
On the other hand, anti-Libyan regimes in Sudan have used Darfur to subvert Gaddafi’s plans. 
The following example should illustrate how Darfur has been used as a political weapon in 
consecutive regimes in Sudan and how this have impacted and exacerbated the tensions in the 
region. In 1976 Libya had a grand strategy to attack Khartoum, a strategy which failed. 
Sudan’s president Numeiri later supported a politician in Chad called Hissan Habre and his bid 
for power in Chad, primarily because Habre was anti-Gaddafi and so Darfur became a rear 
base for Habre’s troops.  
 
After Numeiri was outset by the military coup in 1985, Sadiq al-Mahdi under the Umma Party 
basically “sold” Darfur to Libya as a base for attacking the US-supported Habre regime in 
Chad in exchange for financial and military support during the 1986 elections and also during 
the subsequent civil war with Southern Sudan. This practice of “selling” Darfur as a military 
base in exchange for Libyan aid continued even long after the NIF came into control 1989. 
Throughout this period, the Libyans showed a definite preference for the Darfuri Arabs, 
providing them with arms and contributing to further ethnicization in the region. The growing 
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commonness of automatic weapons in Darfur certainly contributed to the current force within 
the region and its society (Kajee, 2006:78). Libya also provided humanitarian aid to Darfur in 
the mid 1980’s famine, often much more efficiently than the American were able to do. Libya 
used this excuse to move troops into Darfur and then to arm the local Arab tribes. Various 
news reports have suggested that Darfur had basically become a de facto province of Libya, 
with Libyan currency in use and Libyan guns everywhere.  
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Chapter 5:            Conclusion 
 
5.1     Overview of the main findings  
 
In the context of the present conflict in Darfur, and in the years preceding it, the distinction 
between so-called African and Arab tribes has come to the forefront, and the tribal identity of 
individuals has increased in significance. As shown in chapter three, these distinctions were 
never as clear cut and definite as they are today. The ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ distinction that was 
always more of a passive distinction in the past has now become the reason for standing on 
different sides of the political divide. The perception of one’s self and of others plays a key 
role in this context (International Commission of Inquiry in Darfur, 2005). What then are the 
main factors which contributed to this new violent distinction between Arab and African?  
 
Chapter three and four illustrated how this distinction stems, to a large extent, from the 
“cumulative effects of marginalization, competing economic interests” and, more recently, 
from the “political polarization which has engulfed the region”. Although the thesis also 
showed that there is a long history behind the current conflict starting in seventeenth century, 
most of the factors leading to the current Arab/African antagonism was traced to contemporary 
factors such as, firstly, the marginalization and neglect of Darfur by the central government 
since the nineteenth century. This contributed to the failing political institutions so prominent 
in Sudan today, including the judicial system, policing and the military, which historically and 
recently appear to have favored certain groups over others. Also under the category of 
marginalization and neglect are factors such as failing development, including healthcare, 
education, transport and agricultural projects, which have all affected different ethnic groups to 
a different extent.  
 
A second factor highlighted by the thesis was the tactical manipulation of ethnic identities 
within Darfur by the government of Sudan and by political parties. This included the 
mobilization of armed militias (or Janjaweed) and political mobilization based on religious and 
ethnic identity such as Islamisation, Arabism and the Arab Gathering initiative by regional 
actors such as Libya. What the government achieved in its counter-insurgency strategy via the 
Arab militia was to weaken the rebel movements, yet at the same time, dividing the Darfurians 
and creating a conflict along strict ethnic lines. Also included under this category was the 
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government of Sudan’s relative weakness with regards to its political center, combined with a 
simultaneous over-dominance of the centre, which resulted in a very specific kind of center vs. 
periphery and ethnic-based political maneuvering.   
 
A third factor contributing to the Arab/African divide involves wider regional conflicts, which 
have contributed to the development and use of ethnically distinct armed militias, and also to 
the increased number of firearms owned by Darfurians. These conflicts include the North-
South civil war, as well as the long-running conflicts within Chad and between Chad and 
Libya, which have affected the relationship between these countries and Sudan and also the 
internal ethnic composition within Sudan. By using the new war framework in the study, the 
thesis was able shed more light on exactly how and to what effect this process of ethnic 
division was created and sustained. 
 
5.2   Relevance of the New War Framework 
 
The preceding chapters have shown how the complex identities in Darfur have been radically 
over-simplified in recent times and how a polarized 'Arab versus African' dichotomy has been 
created. The ideological construction of these polarized identities has gone hand-in-hand with 
the militarization of Darfur, first through the spread of small arms, then through the 
organization of militia, and finally through full-scale war. The thesis has shown how the war in 
Darfur, exactly in line with the new war argument, has political goals with the political 
mobilization occurring on the basis of identity. Kaldor (2006) would agree that the political 
goals in Darfur are about the claim to power based on seemingly traditional identities such as 
Arab or African. Defining identity politics as “movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial 
or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power” (Kaldor, 2006: 80), it is quite 
apparent that Darfur has become subject to this these kind of new war politics.  
 
As the thesis has show, identity politics in Darfur have been fostered from above as a reaction 
by the established political classes to the growing impotence and declining legitimacy they face 
within the structure of the state. Within the context of the serious loss of physical coercion on 
behalf of the state, coupled with the loss of popular legitimacy and effective leadership, 
identity politics has become a survival tactic for politicians active in national politics either at 
the regional or at the national level. Identity politics has also been fostered from below in the 
sense that it emerged as a result of insecurity associated with underdevelopment, poverty, 
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inequality and various other grievance related factors. In the light of these conditions, it 
becomes easier for disenchanted people to mobilize along ethnic line, especially in the absence 
of government support. One of the biggest problems in the new wars, and especially in Darfur, 
is the fact that certain politicians, elites or intellectuals ally with one or other of these ‘ethnic 
groups’ on the margins of society. What these politicians or elites do is mobilize the excluded, 
the abandoned, the landless, the insecure or the impoverished, all for the purpose of capturing 
support and so sustaining power. The Government of Sudan and its use of the Arab Janjaweed 
against the rebel movements and civilians fall in direct line with this argument. 
 
Another aspect of the new wars which corresponds to the current war in Darfur is the 
privatization of force. The thesis has noted how the state of Sudan has begun to lose control 
over and seen the fragmentation of the instruments of physical coercion. What this means is 
that the state moves into a position where it can no longer maintain control over its territory. It 
is at this point where one sees the fragmentation of military units. In the case of Darfur and this 
thesis, this was exemplified by looking at the growing prevalence of para-state and private 
players which have been featuring more and more in the conflict since the beginning of the 
1990s. As in the case of new wars, Darfur has also seen the emergence of a wide variety of 
fighting units which include both public and private, state and non-state, and a mixture of 
these. Since the beginning of 2006 the Janjaweed has also begun to operate as a completely 
separate entity able to confront and present aggressive demands to the government.    
 
In Darfur one may therefore point to a direct relation between this form of military 
privatization and the states’ loss of its legitimate monopoly of military force. This is illustrated 
by the fact that when the state does feature in the war, it usually only does so with the 
assistance of para-state units (or the Janjaweed), these para-state actors often only being in the 
conflict with the aim of financial or commercial gain. Economic motivations therefore feature 
strongly in the considerations of these militias, as with most new wars.  Up until now 
commercial incentives has come in the form of the belongings from the houses of those that 
they drove out and murdered, or simply taking over the land and its livestock. Another new 
war characteristic of the war in Darfur is that it has becomes harder and harder to distinguish 
between the rebel and the legitimate bearer of arms and the non-combatant, or between a 
soldier and a criminal. Because of the economic incentives for joining the war, Darfur has seen 
the emergence broad array of different actors (often indistinguishable from one another) with 
many of them conducting warfare purely as a means to a earning a living. More and more rebel 
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groups have also started to emerge to the point where conflict resolution efforts are starting to 
take strain in their attempts to identify and include all the parties involved.  
 
The combination of fear and violence was a particularly potent combination for forging these 
simplified and polarized identities, and these labels are likely to persist as long as the war 
continues. The U.S. government's determination that the atrocities in Darfur amount to 
'genocide' and the popular use of the terms 'Arab' and 'African' by journalists, aid agencies and 
diplomats, have further entrenched this polarization, to the degree that community leaders for 
whom the term 'African' would have been alien even a decade ago, now readily identify 
themselves as such when dealing with international monitors. 
 
It seems therefore, that the current war in Darfur can definitely be classified as a new war in 
that it corresponds to most or all of the key characteristics of the new war phenomena as lain 
out by scholars such as Kaldor, Munkler, and van Creveld. Also, this framework greatly 
assisted the thesis in answering the research question of whether the conflict has ancient ethnic 
root causes or whether it has contemporary political causes. The new war argument clearly 
states that ethnic conflicts are indeed a modern phenomenon and should be seen in the context 
of modernization. Together with the data presented up to this point regarding the contemporary 
origins of the Darfur conflict, the new war framework therefore also greatly assists the thesis in 
reflecting on the research question presented in chapter one. In the first chapter the study 
questioned the popular argument that ethnic conflict arises out of an “ancient hatred” or “tribal 
warfare”. How is it possible for people and communities who have a positive history of 
cooperation and tolerance to suddenly plunge into a situation of such cruelty and hate towards 
one another.  
 
5.3     Modern New War or tribal war? 
 
The mainstream media channels have often framed African and other developing regions’ 
conflicts in terms of deterioration to an earlier stage of development. Looking at some of the 
media depictions on the current war in Darfur, one detects a certain style of documenting 
which delve more into the “Heart of Darkness” (referring to the book by Joseph Conrad 
covering the early colonial atrocities in the Congo) than into bringing forth news which outline 
the threat which this war might hold for international peace and security. Accompanied by this 
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portrayal of African conflict is the ever present claim that these wars are essentially between 
what used to be called tribes, and are today more correctly referred to as ethnic groups. Also 
implied in this use of the term ethnic group is that they are violent by nature.  
 
The problem with this, as have been mentioned before, is that very little further explanation is 
then required as to why the war is taking place and who the main antagonists are. According to 
this critique, the ethnic explanation is only another way of saying that these wars are caused by 
the nature of certain cultures that have “fundamentally been unable or unwilling to modernize”.  
The popular media view therefore often corresponds with the primordialist view which holds 
that there exists an ancient or primitive aspect of humanity which historically and evolutionary 
dictates human conduct. Like the mainstream media, some primordialists also frame African 
conflict in terms of deterioration to an earlier stage of development, rejecting modernization 
and often explaining these wars as the result of the failure of modernizing ideologies.  The 
phenomenon where people exhibit fierce identification with a certain ethnicity is considered an 
historical process which has its roots in human evolution, as opposed to being the result of 
modern political construct.  
 
The Khartoum government also keeps insisting that the Darfur conflict is an inter-tribal one 
that has become much worst purely because of successive droughts and famine. The thesis has 
shown that this is not all there is too the conflict, especially when one looks at the way in 
which the government has bombed the villages of Darfur with official army aircrafts. 
Furthermore, the co-option of the Janjaweed into the regular army cannot be explained 
according an “ethnic hatred” or “tribal war” argument and therefore requires one to consider 
other factors not taken into account by the mainstream media and the Sudanese government 
reports.  
 
Recent UN reports found “credible information that the government of Sudan continues to 
support the Janjaweed through the provision of weapons and vehicles. The Janjaweed/ armed 
militias appear to have upgraded their modus operandi from horses, camels and AK-47s to land 
cruisers, pickup trucks and rocket-propelled grenades…Their continued access to ammunition 
and weapons is evident in their ability to co-ordinate with the Sudanese armed forces in 
perpetrating attacks on villages and to engage in armed conflict with rebel groups” (United 
Nations, 2006: paragraph 76).  
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This convenient view presented by the Sudanese government has an unfortunate consequence 
in that it diverts the necessary attention away from the basic, yet important, question already 
raised by this thesis: how is it that a society or a group of people who have been living together 
in relative harmony for generation after generation in a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual context 
become capable of such extreme hatred, abuse and ethnocentrism. As indicated in the 
preceding chapters, part of the answer too this question lies in the historical development of 
ethnic identities, specifically from the colonial period and onwards. A second explanation for 
this question lie in the specific techniques, strategies and methods which politicians and the 
elite employs in order to turn the already manipulated form and sense of ethnicity into a 
resource for advancing personal agendas (Turton, 1997; 83).  
 
There seems to exist a very strong link between the government of Sudan’s actions, motives 
and composition and the idea held by the new war framework and instrumentalists that “ethno-
political activism   is motivated by people’s deep-seated grievances about their collective status 
in combination with the situationally determined pursuit of political interests, as determined by 
group leaders and political entrepreneurs” (Gurr 1998: 123). What is meant by this quote is that 
in order for an ethnic group to be mobilized to the extent of taking up arms and violently 
confronting another group as was done in Darfur, there has to be a very strong sense of 
grievance which is experienced or shared by the majority of that group and which have been 
induced by politicians and powerful elite pre-occupied with serving their own interests. The 
thesis  have presented a clear case of how peripheral areas in Sudan suffers at the hand of the 
central government and how the conflict which eventually broke out in Darfur can be seen as 
the direct result of governmental doings and manoeuvring.  
The Sudanese state therefore seems to be a key factor in keeping peripheral areas such as 
Darfur classified as “closed district” which had the result of marginalizing the region and 
excluding them from the development processes of the country. Also, the government’s use of 
the Janjaweed in its counter-insurgency strategy seems to have contributed to mobilizing one 
group in opposition of another. The state, however, only constitutes one aspect of this 
grievance. Colonialism and the politics of decolonization also greatly contributed to the current 
structure and therefore deserve analytical recognition. Furthermore, ecological factors such as 
drought and desertification also helped create the ideal context within which this form of 
mobilization might occur. Therefore, even though the conflict may bare strong ancient ethnic 
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dimensions, it is possible to argue that it remains essentially a new and modern political and 
economical conflict. 
5.4     Concluding Remarks 
 
Judging by the facts presented throughout the thesis, it seems in order to claim that it is largely 
political developments that are driving the rapidly growing distinction between ‘Arab’ and 
‘African’. Furthermore, the Thesis has shown how ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ seem to have become 
political identities. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that those tribes in Darfur who support 
the rebels have increasingly come to be identified as ‘African’, whereas those tribes supporting 
the government are identified as the ‘Arabs’. The emergence of fierce ethnic consciousness and 
violence in Darfur, which constructed itself on the basis of certain traditional social divisions 
can therefore be understood in terms of the struggle, on the part of the increasingly desperate 
elites of Sudan, to control the remnants of the state. Kaldor (2006) might perhaps argue that the 
emergence of such strong ethnic cleavages (or what she would call nationalism) paralleled the 
slow disintegration of the state’s power over Darfur.  
 
This thesis therefore brings into question the notion that these politics of particularistic 
identities arise out of an ancient hatred or tribal warfare context. Rather, politics of identity 
should more often be seen as a result of individuals, groups or politician reacting to the effects 
marginalization, underdevelopment or loss of state power and legitimacy with identity politics 
merely being an easy means of mobilizing people behind a greater sentiment arising from these 
conditions. The following quote might support the view presented above: “if the Sudanese 
government has not resorted to mobilizing ethnic/racial divisions by recruiting the Janjaweed 
militias, the conflict could have stood exclusively as one between a marginalized region 
struggling to regain some from of equal treatment” (Tar, 2005: 143).  
 
These politicians and elite actors therefore found it very useful to play the ethnic card because 
it allowed them to legitimize their control at a time when their power and authority might have 
been slipping from them (Brown, 2001:19). By using ancient sentiments it can become 
possible drive the masses and by manipulating these sentiments it becomes possible to divide 
groups that used to be unified (de Almeida, 2007: 15). What the government of Sudan was able 
to achieve was to “[deflect] the discontent of the one ethnic group by turning their frustrations 
against another ethnic group” (Keen, 2000). Therefore, the idea that these types of conflicts 
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arise out of ancient ethnic hatred should be brought into questioned. Some might even argue 
that this idea could be considered as unethical in that it “[makes it] easier for the international 
community to stand aside while millions of people have been killed or made homeless” 
(Turton, 1997: 81). 
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